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ABSTRACT 
Recently, there has been an increasing amount of attention paid to Mexico and its 
struggle with drug cartels.  The drug war in Mexico has cost the lives of 28,000 people 
since 2006, leading to a growing concern that Mexico may become a narco-state.  
Although the situation in Mexico seems uncontrollable, this is not the first time drug 
trafficking organizations (DTO) have threatened the livelihood of a state.  Colombia from 
the 1980s through the mid-1990s was dominated by cartels that ruled with violence and 
almost brought Colombia to its knees.  Colombia today continues with its fight against 
DTOs; however, the security of the state is no longer directly threatened by cartels.   
This thesis will discuss the history of the cocaine trade and explain why Mexico 
was able to supplant Colombia as the cocaine epicenter.  Likewise, we will discuss the 
U.S. strategy to combat DTOs and identify shortcomings in order to implement a better 
strategy to defeat the cartels.  We have seen an increase in violence in Mexico and it is 
critical for the U.S. to act in order to prevent the U.S. homeland from coming under siege 
by the bloody Mexican drug war fueled by the cartels.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 When one thinks of Mexico, one of the first images that may come to mind is the 
cocaine epidemic and how the violent narco-traffickers have waged a bloody war on the 
streets of Mexico.  Over the past several years, and especially since 2006, Mexico’s drug-
related violence and deterioration of internal security have rapidly increased.1  In 2008 
alone, 6,290 people died in Mexico due to drug-related violence, which is more than the 
total casualties in Iraq in 2008.2  The reason for the sudden rise in violence and state of 
lawlessness in Mexico is due in large part to the stranglehold the Mexican cartels have on 
the country.  The rampant violence in Mexico has caused United States (U.S.) 
policymakers to view Mexico and its struggles with the various drug-trafficking 
organizations (DTO) as a considerable threat to the U.S. homeland.   
Mexico is not the first state to be put under siege by DTOs and their turf battles to 
control the drug trade.  From the 1980s until the early 1990s, Colombia, which at the time 
was the cocaine capital of the world, faced a similar threat from DTOs, more specifically, 
the Medellin and Cali cartels.  Similar to the current situation in Mexico, the Medellin 
and Cali cartels had a stranglehold on Colombia and its citizens.  However, with the fall 
of both the Medellin and Cali cartels in the mid-1990s, the remaining Colombian cartels 
could not maintain control of the cocaine trade, and we began to see the cocaine trade 
shift from Colombia to Mexico in a phenomenon known as the “balloon effect.” 
It is often noted that the Colombian case study is similar to Mexico’s current 
quagmire.  However, upon further investigation, one will note that there are several 
distinct differences between both scenarios.  This study will seek to answer three major 
questions.  First, does the Colombian case study resemble the current situation in Mexico 
                                                 
1 Hal Brands, Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2009), 4. 
2 Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia," Foreign 
Policy Paper Series, no. 13 (March 2009), 1–2. 
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and, if so, what lessons can we draw upon in the current struggle?  Second, we will 
compare and contrast Plan Colombia (U.S. assistance program to combat the DTOs in 
Colombia) with the Merida Initiative (U.S. assistance program to combat DTOs in 
Mexico), and see if we can identify the strengths and weaknesses of both plans.  Third, 
based on the balloon effect and the shift of the cocaine trade from Colombia to Mexico, 
we will investigate several Latin American countries, such as Panama and Nicaragua, to 
see if any of these countries share similar traits with Colombia and Mexico.  Based on 
our comparison of Latin American states, we will identify the primary threat(s) who can 
possibly supplant Mexico as the next cocaine capital.  The balloon effect occurred before 
when the cocaine trade shifted from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia and once again from 
Colombia to Mexico, so it is critical for us to identify potential threats in order to prevent 
a new state from seizing control of the cocaine trade.  Finally, based on the three 
questions addressed, we will identify the threats the U.S. faces from sharing a border with 
the primary player in the cocaine trade: Mexico.  Likewise, we will identify ways in 
which the U.S. is combating the threat from Mexico.  Upon investigating these questions, 
we will seek to make recommendations for how to improve the U.S. approach in 
combating the cocaine epidemic in Mexico.                 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Events such as the killing of two U.S. Consulate employees in Juarez, Mexico on 
March 13, 2010, serve as a chilling reminder that the state we share our southern border 
with is engaged in a vicious and bloody battle with the Mexican drug cartels.  Since 
President Nixon first launched the war against drugs, the U.S. has been engaged in a 
bitter battle with well-funded narco-traffickers who refuse to relinquish control of an 
extremely profitable business.  The U.S. has spent over a trillion dollars combating the 
cocaine epidemic, yet the price and availability of cocaine in the U.S. has remained 
relatively unchanged.3  U.S. drug czar Gil Kerlikowske recently said, “In the grand 
                                                 
3 Martha Mendoza, “U.S. Drug War Has Met None of Its Goals,” AP, May 13, 2010. 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126802382 (accessed May 17, 2010). 
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scheme (our strategy) has not been successful.  Forty years later, the concern about drugs 
and the drug problem is, if anything, magnified, intensified.”4   
Prior to 2000, the cocaine trade seemed centered in Colombia, and although we 
viewed Colombia as a concern, the violence was thousands of miles away and did not 
pose an immediate threat.  However, with Mexico now becoming the cocaine capital, we 
are no longer afforded the luxury of geographical barriers separating us from the graphic 
violence due to the drug wars fought between rival Mexican cartels.  The DTOs have 
engaged in a bitter turf battle for control of the multi-billion dollar cocaine trade, which 
has threatened the internal security of the state of Mexico.  Due to the increase in 
violence, our trade with Mexico (which is the U.S.’s third largest trading partner) has 
been adversely affected, but more importantly, there is a fear that the violence in Mexico 
will begin to “spillover” across the border into the U.S.   
Many people compare Mexico’s current state of peril to what Colombia endured 
from the late 1980s through the early 1990s.  There may be similarities between the two 
cases; however, there are also fundamental differences that must be recognized before 
making such a claim.  Furthermore, it is important that we learn from both the successes 
and failures in Colombia and formulate a proper strategy to combat the problems in 
Mexico.  Due to the importance of this problem, there is ample literature available 
describing the many difficulties we face; however, even though Mexico is the primary 
threat today, we must look into the future and see what other country or countries could 
pose a serious threat and eventually supplant Mexico as the cocaine capital.  As 
mentioned, the U.S. has spent a fortune battling the war on drugs in Colombia, but then 
haplessly watched the drug trade simply shift to Mexico in what is described as the 
“balloon effect,” thus a long-term analysis and strategy is necessary to prevent this 
phenomenon from reoccurring.5   
                                                 
4 Martha Mendoza, “U.S. Drug War Has Met None of Its Goals.” 
5 Johann Hari, "Obama and the Lethal War on Drugs," The Independent (London), February 11, 2009, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-obama-and-the-lethal-war-
on-drugs-1606268.html (accessed April 13, 2010). 
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In summary, this study is important in three ways.  First, we must assist our 
largest trading partner, Mexico, with its struggles against the DTOs and prevent Mexico 
from becoming a narco-state.  Second, in order to avoid violence from “spilling over” the 
border and into the U.S., we must assist the Mexican government in defeating the DTOs.  
Finally, we must learn from the Colombian case and apply the lessons learned to 
formulate a viable strategy to defeat the cartels.  More importantly, we must not focus all 
our attention and resources in Mexico only to see the drug problem shift to another state 
similar to the shift from Colombia to Mexico.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 Our first problem will focus on the history of the cocaine trade in Colombia and 
Mexico and identify the similarities and differences between Mexico’s current state with 
that of Colombia in the 1980s through the early 1990s.  It will be important to note the 
similarities these states share such as corruption, extreme violence, and the fact that these 
states have a long history of combating DTOs.  Likewise, we will discuss how the drug 
trade in Colombia drastically changed following the fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels, 
giving rise to groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC), the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC).  The rise of these groups in the late 1990s marks a different type of 
enemy as compared to the Medellin and Cali cartels.  Often times, Mexico’s current 
struggle is compared to that of Colombia; however, I believe it is important to choose the 
right time frame when comparing the two states.  For this reason, it is important to 
compare Mexico to Colombia during the Colombians struggle against the Medellin and 
Cali cartel, vice the guerrilla and paramilitary groups of today.   
 Our second problem will be based on the outcome of our first problem and will 
focus on Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative.  There are two hypotheses that can be 
formulated based on the outcome of our initial problem and analyzing the U.S.’s 
approach to defeating the Mexican drug cartels.  The first posits that Mexico is suffering 
from the same problem as Colombia did.  In this case, the U.S. assistance package in 
Mexico (Merida Initiative) should look similar to the U.S. assistance package in 
Colombia (Plan Colombia).  The second hypothesis will look at Mexico and Colombia as 
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two distinct cases, and as such, suggests we will need to change our approach in 
defeating the DTOs.  Under this premise, the Merida Initiative would be rejected or 
revised and the U.S. would need to formulate a new assistance package that identifies the 
root problems in Mexico in order to properly address the problems in Mexico.   
 Our third problem will focus on the balloon effect and whether or not there is the 
possibility of this phenomenon occurring once again.  In order to better allocate our 
funding and resources and prevent the balloon effect, we will analyze several Latin 
American countries in the region and identify similarities and differences these states 
share with Colombia and Mexico.  Based on our analysis, we hope to formulate an 
educated hypothesis as to what state or states could supplant Mexico in the future.  I 
hypothesize that there are several factors we might use to identify “at risk” countries, 
which, in time, could supplant Mexico as the cocaine epicenter.  Comparing both the 
government of Colombia in the 1980s through the early 1990s and Mexico in the mid-
1990s through 2010, we realize that both states had a weak and unstable government.  
Likewise, violence and corruption were common in Colombia and Mexico.  Furthermore, 
geographic location has proven beneficial to both Mexico and Colombia since both are 
surrounded by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, which provides them great benefits in the 
cocaine trade since they can use both coasts to smuggle drugs making detection more 
difficult.  Mexico has an added advantage of sharing a border with the United States, 
which opens another route, the land route, to smuggle cocaine to the U.S.  These traits all 
seem to be important in identifying an “at risk” state.  Finally, we will look at the demand 
in the U.S. for cocaine and also the assistance provided by the U.S. to both Colombia 
(Plan Colombia) and Mexico (Merida Initiative) and see what impact this has on our 
hypothesis.  I hypothesize that Guatemala, Panama, and El Salvador will share certain 
traits with both Mexico and Colombia and could become major players in the cocaine 
trade in the future.  For this reason, they should likely be targeted for preventive 
assistance. 
 Our final problem will focus on the threat the Mexican war on drugs has on the 
homeland security of the U.S.  Recently, we have seen the violence in Mexico escalate 
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and since 2006, there have been over 28,000 people murdered due to the drug violence.6  
Due to the fact that the U.S. shares a border with Mexico, this alarming trend of increased 
violence should be a grave concern for the U.S. and protecting its homeland.  We will 
identify the threats the Mexican war on drugs causes for the U.S. and also identify 
methods in which the U.S. is combating the threat from Mexico.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
 This review will discuss reasons as to why the cocaine capital has shifted from 
Colombia to Mexico.  Likewise, we will compare and contrast Mexico’s current state of 
peril to what Colombia endured from the 1980s through the early 1990s.  Next, this 
review will focus on U.S. assistance to Colombia through Plan Colombia and to Mexico 
through the Merida Initiative.  Finally, this literature review will focus on what U.S. 
homeland security problems arise with the cocaine epicenter and the rampant violence 
now shifting to a bordering country.     
In the 1980s through the early 1990s, the world drug trade centered around two 
cartels in Colombia, the Medellin and Cali cartels.  At their peak, these two cartels 
supplied over 80 percent of the cocaine smuggled in the U.S. and were by far the most 
profitable and ruthless organizations.7  Both cartels processed, smuggled, and distributed 
cocaine and, in essence, owned the entire supply chain.8  However, these duopolies were  
broken up in 1993 and 1995, respectively, causing a fundamental change in the cocaine 
business: the rise of hundreds of small cartels, or “cartelitos:” as they are known, 
throughout Colombia.9 
As several authors noted, the cartelitos lacked the financial and business strength 
and were forced to form alliances with Mexican gangs in order to assist with the 
                                                 
6 Arthur Brice, “Drug War Death Toll in Mexico Since 2006 Exceeds 28,000, Official Says,” CNN, 
August 3, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-03/world/mexico.drug.deaths_1_drug-violence-drug-
cartels-zetas?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed September 8, 2010). 
7 Bruce Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs," Foreign Affairs 67, no. 1 (1988), 70. 
8 George Friedman, "The Geopolitics of Dope," Stratfor, January 29, 2008. 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/geopolitics_dope (accessed May 5, 2010). 
9 Menno Vellinga, The Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin America and the International 
System (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 188–189. 
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distribution of cocaine.10  These alliances would be one of the primary causes of the 
cocaine capital to shift from Colombia to Mexico.  A second reason for this shift can be 
attributed to the U.S. interdiction success in the Caribbean.11  Prior to the fall of the 
Medellin and Cali Cartels, drugs flowed seamlessly from Colombia into the U.S. via air 
and sea routes in the Caribbean.12  However, U.S. interdiction in the 1990s by the DEA, 
U.S. Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard began to severely disrupt the flow of cocaine in the 
Caribbean, and the cartels began to seek a more secure route to get their product to the 
U.S.13  The solution was to hire Mexican gangs to serve as a middleman and transport the 
drugs from Colombia to Mexico by land, air, and sea.14  
By the early 2000s, the Mexican cartels were able to wrestle away control of the 
drug trade from Colombia and overtake them as the cocaine kingpins.  Another reason 
Mexico became the main player of the cocaine trade is due largely to its geographic 
advantages.15  Most importantly, it shares a border with the U.S., which is the largest 
consumer of cocaine.16  Similar to Colombia, Mexico is surrounded by both the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans, which serves to open more transporting options, thus facilitating 
transportation.17  The final reason highlighted is the implementation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.  NAFTA has dramatically increased 
the flow of trade and investment with Mexico (Mexico is our third largest trading 
                                                 
10 Friedman, “The Geopolitics of Dope”; Richard Friman, "The Great Escape? Globalization, 
Immigrant Entrepreneurship and the Criminal Economy," Review of International Political Economy 11, 
no. 1 (February 2004), 124.; Francisco Thoumi, "Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom 
to Social Crisis," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 582 (July 2002), 
109.   
11 Rodger Baker, "The Big Business of Organized Crime in Mexico." Stratfor, February 13, 2008. 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/big_business_organized_crime_mexico (accessed May 17, 2010). 
12 Belen Boville, The Cocaine War in Context: Drugs and Politics (New York: Algora Publishing, 
2004), 130–133. 
13 Patrick Clawson and Rensselaer Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1996), 41. 
14 Ibid., 42; Sara Llana Miller, "Mexico's Drug War Seeps Southward," Christian Science Monitor, 
June 14, 2009. http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0616/p10s01-woam.html (accessed May 7, 2010). 
15 Jorge Chabat, "Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 582 (July 2002), 135. 
16 Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 
26–27. 
17 Ibid., 28. 
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partner); however, it also gave the Mexican cartels an added advantage to use the 2,000 
mile border we share in order to smuggle their drugs more easily.18  
According to several authors, the state of lawlessness caused by the Mexican 
cartels bears a striking resemblance to the 1980s and early 1990s when the Medellin and 
Cali cartels were engaged in an all-out confrontation with the Colombian state.19  Most 
experts believe the sudden rise in violence and state of lawlessness in Mexico is due in 
large part to the stranglehold the Mexican cartels have on the country.  Likewise, 
Carpenter argues that rampant violence and execution-style slayings in Mexico bears an 
eerie resemblance to Colombia in the 1980s through the early 1990s.20  There are several 
common traits shared by Mexico’s current state and that of Colombia’s in the 1980s 
through the early 1990s.  Most important to the success of DTOs in either country is the 
constant demand for cocaine in the United States.21  Another common trait is the level of 
violence that has plagued both countries during their struggle with the DTOs.  Colombia 
during the 1980s through the early 1990s suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties 
due to the struggle between the DTOs and the Colombian state.22  Likewise, Mexico’s 
struggle with the DTOs has led to more than 28,000 casualties with over 1,000 occurring 
in the first eight weeks of 2009.23  It is clear from these figures that both states have 
suffered mass casualties due to their fight against DTOs.  Also, these DTOs make billions 
of dollars in profits each year, which allows them to arm themselves with heavy 
weaponry that is more advanced than that of the state and also to bribe political, judicial, 
and law enforcement institutions causing high levels of corruption.24  This high level of 
corruption represents a formidable obstacle to the state because it allows the DTOs to 
                                                 
18 Peter Hakim, "The Uneasy Americas," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 2 (2001), 47–48. 
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operate with minimal interference and provides protection to their cocaine distribution.  
A final similarity is the fact that the DTOs are notorious for hiring prior special-forces 
operatives or mercenaries to work for them and form very formidable armies, which are 
comparable to the state’s law enforcement and military forces.25   
Conversely, there are some distinct differences that we must note between 
Colombia’s DTOs in the 1980s through the early 1990s to that of Mexico’s DTOs.  The 
first difference is the fact that Mexico shares a border with the United States, which 
makes transporting drugs much easier once in Mexico and also the violence can spillover 
to the U.S.26  Secondly, Mexico does not have a presence of guerrilla groups or 
paramilitaries that challenge the state.27  Colombia has had to battle the leftist guerrilla 
group known as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) for the past 
forty years and has also faced opposition from rightist paramilitary groups such as the 
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC).28  Finally, Colombia allowed hundreds of U.S. troops to work jointly with 
Colombian military operations, whereas Mexican officials have made it clear that no U.S. 
military personnel will be allowed to operate in Mexico.29  As one can see, there are 
several key similarities between Colombia in the 1980s through the early 1990s with 
Mexico’s current state; however, there are also fundamental differences that we must 
note between the states and their conflict with the cartels. 
U.S. intervention has played a crucial role in transforming Colombia from a state 
on the brink of failure to a state that is currently experiencing economic prosperity and 
security.  In 2000, President Bush earmarked $7.5 billion in U.S. assistance for a bill that 
became known as Plan Colombia.  Hakim said, “The strategy was for Colombia to retake 
control of country from the left-wing guerrillas, right-wing vigilantes, and drug 
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criminals.30  However, a key point Hakim fails to mention was the stated desire to reduce 
the cultivation of cocaine by 50 percent.31  Although the Bush administration has called 
Plan Colombia an overwhelming success, we must look at the desired goals of Plan 
Colombia and see if these goals have been accomplished.  The security accomplishments 
that were achieved with Plan Colombia are undeniable.  At its peak, the FARC had more 
than 21,000 members and was close to bringing the state of Colombia to its knees.32  
Today, there are fewer than 8,000 members of the FARC and they are now isolated in the 
mountainous region of Colombia instead of major cities where they previously had been, 
and paramilitary groups have demobilized at an increasing rate.33  From a 
counternarcotics strategy, however, Plan Colombia has been an utter failure due to the 
fact that the U.S. placed an emphasis on supply-side strategies, which has done nothing to 
diminish supply.  Coca cultivation today is greater than the coca cultivation in 2000.34  
Likewise, the price of cocaine during this time frame has not increased, which in the 
short-run would show that supply has indeed decreased.35   
In June 2008, President Bush introduced the Merida Initiative, which was a three-
year, $1.4 billion initiative aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of efforts against drug, 
human, and weapons trafficking and restoring security in Mexico.36  According to 
Brands, the vast majority of this money will be to strengthen Mexico’s military and law 
enforcement agencies in order to give them the capacity to take and hold the initiative in 
the fight against the DTOs.37  Most critics view the Merida Initiative as a continuation of 
Plan Colombia and have gone so far as to label it Plan Mexico.      
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The shift of the cocaine epicenter from Colombia to Mexico has also caused a 
significant threat and growing concerns both for the U.S. and homeland defense.  Since 
2006, Mexico has experienced an accelerating increase in drug-related violence and a 
corresponding deterioration of internal security.38  Not surprisingly, Mexico’s inability to 
cope with the cartels has led to an increase in violence, kidnappings, and illegal 
immigration to spillover into the U.S., especially in border states such as Texas, Arizona, 
and California.  Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said, “This issue requires 
immediate action and we are guided by two clear objectives.  First, we are going to do 
everything we can to prevent the violence in Mexico from spilling over across the border.  
And second, we will do all in our power to help Mexican President Felipe Calderon crack 
down on these drug cartels.”39  The U.S. has already dispatched to the border almost one 
thousand more customs, border, and federal firearms agents, along with 1,200 U.S. 
National guardsmen, in order to avoid the spillover effect.40   
With over 90 percent of America’s cocaine traveling through Mexico, and with 
the U.S. supplying over 90 percent of the guns used in drug violence in Mexico, there is 
strong evidence that a problem lies at the porous border.41  In order for the U.S. to assist 
the Mexican government in defeating the cartels, Council of Foreign Relations Fellow 
Shannon O’Neil observes “that the U.S. must first get its own house in order by enforcing 
U.S. gun laws and inspecting traffic on the border going south, not just north in order to 
reduce the tools of violence in Mexico.”42  Thus, to address the problem of arms flows, 
the U.S. should ratify the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of 
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Material, 
(CIFTA).43  According to experts Johanna Mendelson Forman and Peter DeShazo, 
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CIFTA ratification would increase U.S. opportunities for “cooperation among members 
of the Organization of American States (OAS) to control illegal weapons,” and “would 
send a strong signal to Mexico and to other countries in the region that the U.S. is 
determined to be a reliable partner in efforts to promote the security and well-being of all 
citizens in the Americas.”44  The U.S. should also take steps to interdict the billions in 
drug money smuggled across the border, following a model along the lines of the Foreign 
Terrorist Asset Tracking Center, designed to hamper terrorist financiers.45   
In addition, the U.S. should consult with the Mexican government, not only to 
help build law enforcement capacity, but to assist in “efforts to strengthen Mexico’s 
judicial and law enforcement institutions,” by “providing training and information 
sharing” on judicial reform and police reform.46  Likewise, many authors argue that the 
U.S. focuses too much attention on interdiction and not enough on the prevention and 
treatment of drug abusers.  In fact, President Obama is requesting $15.5 billion for the 
war on drugs in 2011, with over two-thirds of the money for law enforcement and 
interdiction capabilities while $5.6 billion will be spent on prevention and treatment.47    
Another overlooked problem is the method in which the narco-traffickers are 
transporting their product.  With the amount of revenue these organizations are able to 
generate, the DTOs are able to invest in high tech, nearly undetectable self propelled 
semi-submersibles (SPSS).  Prior to the SPSS, if a cartel wanted to transport cocaine by 
sea, it would use go-fast vessels that were capable of carrying about one ton of product.  
However, the U.S. has now seen an increase in SPSSs that can carry more than eight tons 
of contraband.  Although the SPSSs are normally used to smuggle cocaine to the U.S., 
the SPPS poses a significant threat to the U.S. Homeland because an SPSS can arrive to a 
U.S. port nearly undetected and can easily substitute cocaine for explosives or some other 
potentially dangerous substance.   
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Mexico is a country that is on the brink of becoming a narco-state, and the U.S. 
must prepare to defend its borders and avoid the violence from spilling over.  The 
Mexican border city of Juarez is a prime example of the dangers that loom across the 
border.  The Wall Street Journal says that “the violent border city of Juarez is turning into 
a ghost town due to the bloodshed from Mexico’s warring drug cartels.”48  This mass 
exodus has left 116,000 homes vacant and over 400,000 people to become displaced and 
forcing some to cross the border illegally to the U.S. in order to avoid the drug 
violence.49  The death toll in Juarez for 2009 was a staggering 2,600 people with more 
than 500 homicides occurring from January to March 2010.50  The latest high-profile 
blow to Juarez came on March 13, 2010, when three people associated with the U.S. 
Consulate in Juarez were gunned down in an incident that drew outrage from both 
President Obama and President Calderon.51  Juarez is an example of a city being 
overwhelmed by the drug cartels and seeing an exponential increase in violence.  Bowden 
and Brands both note that with Mexico sharing a border with the U.S., we have already 
seen violence spilling over to the U.S., U.S. citizens being murdered in Mexico, and also 
an increase in illegal immigration into the U.S. by displaced families from bordering 
cities.52  These are all problems that are beginning to become more prevalent in the U.S., 
and we must take a more proactive approach in protecting our citizens and our homeland.       
In summary, regardless of whether or not Mexico’s current state bears a 
resemblance to Colombia in the 1980s through the early 1990s, we must realize that 
Mexico must become a national priority not only because of its lawless nature but 
because of its proximity to the U.S.  Although Mexico’s situation and that of Colombia’s 
are similar, we need to improve our strategy and not give Mexico a blank check and 
unachievable goals.  According to Naim, the U.S. (federal and state) spends between 
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$35–$40 billion each year on the fight against drugs with the vast majority being spent on 
interdiction and intelligence.53  In order to maximize the amount of money being spent on 
combating drugs, it is of utmost importance to know whom we are fighting and their 
motivations.   
According to Payan, drug trafficking is the most profitable organized crime 
activity in the world and America is the most important market for illegal drugs.54 The 
United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention reports that the worldwide 
drug trade is valued at approximately $400 billion and the U.S.-Mexico border alone is 
worth $80 billion.55  It is clear that the ability to generate such an immense profit is the 
motivation behind the DTOs, and they have demonstrated that they will stop at nothing in 
order to maximize profits.  Flynn compared the Medellin and Cali cartels to operating 
similarly to senior executives at Exxon or Coca-Cola.56  I suggest we take this one step 
further and begin to analyze the DTOs as a Fortune 500 Company and not like a gang of 
thugs who have no strategy.  If we followed business strategies in the 1970s and 1980s, 
we would realize that it was common practice for firms to vertically integrate in order to 
control the supply chain.57  This is similar to what the Medellin and Cali cartels did in 
order to gain a competitive advantage over their competitors and successfully establish a 
duopoly.  In the 1990s, because of globalization, many U.S. firms began to de-integrate 
in order to more cheaply outsource the supply chain.58  This is a similar strategy to what 
the Colombian DTOs did when they began to hire Mexican cartels to transport cocaine 
for them; however, they did not foresee the Mexican cartels eventually becoming the 
dominant players.  I think it is important to analyze the DTOs not as group of uneducated 
thugs but more along the lines of people who understand the business world and can 
implement many of the same strategies in order to increase profits.   
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Also, as Bonville mentions, the U.S. needs a new international policy that allows 
us to turn from the militarized framework we continuously follow and focus on 
consumption.59  Both Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative are supply-side strategies; 
however, as Plan Colombia has shown, this strategy has not affected the amount of 
cocaine produced or increased its price.  I think it would be wise for the U.S. to begin to 
look at ways in which we can implement a demand-side strategy that will focus more 
attention on limiting U.S. consumption.  Also, we must be careful not to focus all our 
attention and resources on one country and then allow the cartels to relocate to another 
country.  If the balloon effect is indeed a true phenomenon, then this could help explain 
why Mexico was able to supplant Colombia.  For this reason, we should pay particular 
attention to Central American countries that could become a victim of the cartels and 
replace Mexico since Mexico is now in the U.S. crosshairs.  Hari mentions that the U.S. 
spent a fortune battling the war on drugs in Colombia, then haplessly watched the drug 
trade simply shift to Mexico in what is known as the “balloon effect.”60  In order to 
effectively combat the drug war, we must learn from Plan Colombia and implement new 
changes to the Merida Initiative to restore order in Mexico.  The drug capital has shifted 
from Colombia to Mexico and we must do everything within our power to prevent 
violence from spilling over to the U.S. and also ensure that our trade with Mexico is not 
affected because of the spike in violence.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The primary method for this thesis is reviewing case studies.  Mexico has often 
drawn comparisons to Colombia from the 1980s through the early 1990s, thus using 
Colombia as a case study is critical in helping us identify the similarities and differences 
to the Mexican case.  Furthermore, the information gathered from these two case studies 
will be applied to other Latin American countries in order to identify countries that could 
be at risk in the future and eventually find themselves “occupied” by DTOs.   
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Aside from case studies, I will contact several agencies such as the DEA, U.S. 
Coast Guard and JIATF-S for background information on the topic.  These agencies will 
also be able to recommend literature sources to conduct a more thorough study.   
Finally, due to the importance of this topic, there is an abundance of literature 
available from professional journals, academic journals, magazines, websites, and a host 
of other sources.  We will use a wide array of sources in order to gain a better 
understanding of the situation in Mexico and the problems the U.S. homeland faces with 
such a dangerous threat.  By using various literature sources and using case studies, we 
will have inputs that are diverse, which will help us get a better understanding of the 
cocaine epidemic and hopefully be able to make recommendations on how to approach 
this continuous struggle with DTOs.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
 The first chapter of this thesis begins by stating the questions, importance of the 
topic, and the methodology to be used.  The second chapter will review the historical 
background of the cocaine trade in both Colombia and Mexico.  We will describe the rise 
and fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia and describe how U.S. intervention 
was key in their demise.  This chapter will also explore how the fall of the Medellin and 
Cali cartels gave way to a new cocaine business model and how the cocaine capital began 
to shift from Colombia to Mexico.  We will then briefly review the Mexican cartels in 
order to explain the current threat.  Finally, based on our comparison of Colombia and 
Mexico, we will decide whether or not it is prudent to compare Mexico’s current state to 
that of Colombia. 
 The third chapter will evaluate the U.S. response to the cocaine epidemic in 
Colombia and Mexico by comparing and contrasting Plan Colombia with the Merida 
Initiative.  These two U.S. assistance programs serve as the foundation of U.S. response 
to combating the cocaine epidemic.  This chapter will identify the similarities and 
differences between the two programs and based on our assessment from Chapter II, we 




 Next, we will investigate the balloon effect and the possibility of this 
phenomenon occurring once again.  Based on the similarities and differences identified 
between the Colombia and Mexico in Chapter II, we will try to identify what conditions 
are necessary for a country to become the cocaine capital.  We will look at certain 
variables such as level of corruption, geographic advantages, and GDP among other 
factors to identify which variables are significant and common between Colombia and 
Mexico.  We will then apply the findings to other countries in Latin America (i.e., 
Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, etc.) with the hope of identifying countries that could 
pose a problem in the near future and perhaps supplant Mexico as the cocaine epicenter. 
 Our final chapter will focus on the problems posed by the Mexican cocaine war 
and how it affects the U.S.  No longer is the cocaine capital located in a distant location; 
instead, we share a border with the dominant player in the cocaine trade.  We will discuss 
the various threats the Mexican drug war has on the U.S. in order for us to protect our 
homeland from drug violence spilling into the U.S.  Likewise, we will discuss U.S. 
policies and methods to combat potential homeland security problems that arise from the 
cocaine trade.  Finally, we will make recommendations in order to improve our fight 
against the DTOs.  Likewise, based on our study of other Latin American countries that 
could become major source of the cocaine trade, we will make recommendations on how 
to improve our readiness to combat these future threats.  The U.S. has been engaged in a 
drug war for over forty years, and by studying the evolution of the cocaine epidemic, we 
may be able to identify weaknesses in our approach against the DTOs and correct them in 
order to defeat the cartels.   
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II. HISTORY OF THE COCAINE TRADE IN COLOMBIA AND 
MEXICO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Mexico has dominated the news lately and has captured the attention of U.S. 
policymakers due to its continual struggle against Mexican drug cartels.  However, 
Mexico’s struggle against DTOs did not occur overnight nor is this the first time a state 
has been on the brink of becoming a narco-state.  Many often compare Mexico’s struggle 
against cartels to Colombia; however, we will show that the struggle in Colombia must 
be divided into two different stages.  The first stage occurred from the 1980s through the 
mid 1990s when Colombia was threatened by both the Medellin and Cali cartels.  The 
second stage occurred after the fall of both cartels in Colombia and gave rise to leftist 
guerrilla groups such as the FARC and rightwing paramilitary groups such as the AUC 
and ELN.  Thus if we are going to compare Mexico to Colombia, it is important for us to 
decide which timeframe Mexico’s current struggle resembles.   
This chapter will be divided into two primary sections.  The first section will 
provide background information and review the start of the cocaine trade.  We will then 
discuss the cocaine trade in Colombia and how it has evolved since the mid-1970s.  Next, 
this chapter will describe the key players in the Colombian drug trade in sequential order.  
We will first discuss Colombia’s struggle against DTOs, specifically, the Medellin and 
Cali cartels.  Then, we will discuss the organizations that were able to seize control of the 
drug trade following the fall of the cartels in Colombia: the FARC and the AUC.  Finally, 
this chapter will discuss the history of DTOs in Mexico and discuss how the cartels of 
today seized control of the cocaine trade.  The intent of this chapter is to show whether or 
not Mexico’s struggle today is similar to the threat Colombia faced, and if so, does 
Mexico’s struggle more resemble the fight against the Colombian cartels or the recent 
struggle against guerrilla and paramilitary groups.  Furthermore, we will show that both 
Colombia and Mexico share many common traits such as corruption, geographic 
advantages, and a rich history of criminal organizations influencing the state.     
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1. Background 
 The production of coca leaves is by no means a new business nor did it start with 
the rise of cocaine.  Indigenous people of the Andean mountain range have been chewing 
the leaves of the coca plant for thousands of years.  In fact, archaeological evidence 
indicates that Peruvians were chewing coca leaves as early as 1800 B.C., making the coca 
plant one of the first cultivated and domesticated plants in the New World.61  For this 
reason, coca cultivation today plays an important role in the culture and livelihood of 
many coca farmers, particularly in Bolivia.  Similarly, coca is only grown in the Andean 
mountain range in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia giving the area a monopoly on coca 
production.62    
Although in 1969 President Nixon first coined the phrase “war on drugs,” one 
could argue that the war on drugs started much earlier.63  Contrary to popular belief, the 
war on drugs did not start with Pablo Escobar or with the ruthless cartels that run Mexico 
today.  According to McCoy, “the global movement for prohibition of narcotics began in 
the 1870s when the Protestant churches of England and America, reviving the tactics of 
their earlier antislavery campaign, launched a moral crusade against the drug trade.”64  
Gootenberg argues that even though there had long been “some recreational use of 
cocaine, and illicit sales, both fell into severe decline by the 1920s.  Cocaine had never 
spawned any organized form of illicit production or systematic traffic from producing 
zones.”65  Cocaine was discovered to have medical benefits and was used as a local 
anesthetic after the 1850s, however, due to the addictive nature of the drug, the U.S. 
suffered a well-known cocaine epidemic at the turn of the twentieth century during the 
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drug’s legal era.”66  With prohibition being enforced with the 1914 Harrison Narcotic 
Act, cocaine imports being halted in 1922, strict self-regulation by pharmaceutical firms 
and dentists, and the fact that most cocaine addicts either decreased or switched vices and 
contraband (such as alcohol and heroin), we begin to see a sharp decrease in the demand 
for cocaine.67   
Due to the sharp decline of cocaine, “the first documented case of South 
American cocaine smuggling dates from 1939, where undercover police officers on 
Brooklyn’s 16th Street pier nabbed Ramon Urbina, a Chilean sailor with a 250 gm 
sample of cocaine.”68  Although the next incident would not occur for eight more years, 
by 1948, “cocaine was moving beyond individual or opportunistic smuggling and being 
replaced by Latin cocaine smugglers from Callao, Peru to Havana, Cuba and into New 
York City.”69  Thus, from the mid-1940s until the mid-1960s, there was not a single 
dominant country who owned the cocaine trade.  Instead various Latin American 
countries such as Peru, Chile, Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina started the 
illicit cocaine trade from 1945–1965 with small cocaine operations.  Gootenberg argues, 
“illicit cocaine for overseas use was born in Peru in 1947–1950 with the suppression of a 
declining legal cocaine sector, and then pushed onto Bolivia, where the revolution 
progressively fostered cocaine’s development until 1964.”70  Similarly, “the 1959 Cuban 
revolution marked a milestone in cocaine’s evolution, as it sent seasoned Cuban drug 
smugglers into faraway new hideouts and markets creating, in effect, the first specialized 
class of pan-American traffickers.”71   
From the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s, the cocaine trade consisted mainly of 
smugglers carrying a few kilograms of cocaine on international flights resulting in the 
supply of cocaine to reach only a kilogram yearly, with annual seizures reaching 8.4 
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kilograms by 1959.72  Due to the limited supply of cocaine, the price of a kilogram of 
cocaine was upwards of $150,000 and would remain at these levels until the 1970s.  
However, 1973 would mark a drastic change in the cocaine trade due to the amount of 
cocaine inundating the market and also the spike in violence and coercion from the 
cartelization and hostile takeover of the cocaine trade by Colombian DTOs.73  This 
hostile takeover by Colombian DTOs would forever change the cocaine trade and cocaine 
smuggling would no longer be measured in kilograms but in metric tons. 
B. COLOMBIA: THE COMMODITIZATION OF COCAINE 
 Colombia, prior to the 1970s, was a state decimated by decades of lawlessness 
and civil strife following the aftermath of La Violencia, (the Violence), which lasted ten 
years (1948–1958) following the assassination of Colombian presidential candidate Jorge 
Gaitan and claimed the lives of over 200,000 Colombians.  The disorganization of the 
central state caused by the decades of regional violence allowed Colombian 
“anitoqueños” to become efficient in the marijuana trade to the U.S. and eventually the 
dominant player in the cocaine trade.74  Although during the 1960s Colombian traffickers 
played a secondary role to the Cubans in the cocaine trade, three changes would cause a 
reversal in roles and see the Colombian’s dominate the cocaine trade.   
First, “the increased migration of Colombians to the United States in the 1960s 
enabled Colombians to set up transnational drug networks allowing them to export drugs 
directly from Colombia to the U.S.”75  According to Restrepo, “the main suppliers of 
Cuban cocaine traffickers during the 1960s were Colombians, who would buy the coca 
paste from peasant farmers in Peru and Bolivia, transform it to cocaine, and sell it to the 
Cubans for distribution to the U.S.”76  However, with the transnational drug networks 
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now in place due to Colombian immigrants migrating to the U.S., the Colombians no 
longer had a need for Cuban traffickers.  Thus, instead of owning only the production 
phase, the Colombians were able to also own the distribution phase and in essence, own 
the entire supply chain of the cocaine industry.  Second, “Colombian security forces 
came down heavily on independent foreign traffickers, thus unwittingly doing Colombian 
exporters a great favor.”77  After 1972, Colombia’s Security Department (DAS) and the 
National Police “began to act against traffickers, and they managed to put an end to the 
travels of some foreign adventurers who had been coming into Colombia to buy up drugs 
in order to sell them later to their home countries.”78  In essence, Colombian security 
forces were unknowingly eliminating the competition for Colombian DTOs.   Finally, 
“Colombian criminals used previously unheard of methods of violence to supplant the 
Cubans.”79  Due to the large networks the Colombians had established, there was no 
longer a need for Cuban traffickers and the Colombian waged a bloody war against the 
Cubans primarily in Miami and New York, and by 1978, those Cubans still involved in 
the business were working for the Colombian DTOs.80   
Thus from the mid-1970s, the Colombian DTOs, along with the unintended 
assistance from Colombian security forces, were able to eliminate the Cuban middlemen 
and seize control of the cocaine trade prior to the second cocaine epidemic that was 
sweeping into the U.S.81  For the three reasons stated, along with the sheer luck of timing 
the Colombians had in seizing the cocaine trade, the Colombian DTOs would shift from 
being marijuana exporters to cocaine kingpins and would give rise to the notorious 
Medellin and Cali cartels along with criminals such as Pablo Escobar, the Rodriguez 
Orejuela brothers, and Carlos Lehder.  Furthermore, one can argue that following the fall 
of the Medellin and Cali cartels, the benefactors of the cocaine trade would be the FARC 
and AUC and their power would peak following the fall of the cartels.   
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1. The Medellin Cartel: Power Through Violence 
In the mid-1970s through the early 1990s, the world cocaine trade centered 
around two cartels in Colombia, the Medellin and Cali cartels.  At their peak, these two 
cartels supplied over 80 percent of the cocaine smuggled in the U.S. and were by far the 
most profitable and ruthless crime organizations in the world.82  Both cartels processed, 
smuggled, and distributed cocaine, and in essence, owned the entire supply.83  Although 
both cartels were powerful, the Medellin cartel operated mainly by striking fear to their 
enemies and having zero regard for the law.  However, the primary reason why the 
Medellin cartel would capture a worldwide audience was due to their flamboyant leader, 
Pablo Escobar, who became a larger than life figure and also one of America’s most 
wanted fugitives.      
When a person thinks of cocaine usually the first image that one thinks of 
involves Pablo Escobar and his brutality portrayed by many Hollywood films.  Although 
some of these stories may be an exaggeration, Escobar was and still is the most notorious 
drug kingpin the world has known.  There is no doubt that Escobar was a feared man in 
Colombia and anyone who betrayed him would be killed along with his family, friends, 
and acquaintances.  His killings were all cruel, deadly, smart, and with an eye toward 
public relations and unfortunately would set the precedent for future narco-traffickers.84  
Likewise, Escobar and his seemingly endless supply of money allowed corruption to 
reach the highest offices of both the Colombian civil and military sectors usually in the 
form of bribes.85  These bribes allowed for the cartels to preserve the supply chain and 
allowed the organization to run freely with minimal outside interference.  If some 
organization, whether it be the police, military, or a political figure, tried to deter the 
cartel’s operations, then the person or persons would be ruthlessly murdered.86   
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Although violence was normally reserved for those who betrayed the Medellin 
cartel, one word would change the way the Medellin cartel conducted business: 
extradition.  The extradition treaty between Colombia and the U.S. was signed in 1979; 
however, it had yet to take effect.87  In order to avoid extradition, Escobar successfully 
campaigned and won a seat in the Chamber of Representatives of Colombia’s Congress 
in 1982.  By becoming an elected official, Escobar guaranteed himself that he would not 
be extradited for two years, since elected officials were not eligible for extradition to the 
U.S.  Escobar was elected with little difficulty; however, some political figures, 
especially Luis Carlos Galan, took exception to Escobar’s nomination and thought that 
the presence of the head of the Medellin cartel was a profanation of the legislature due to 
the campaigns that were financed by dirty money.88   Galan and Justice Minister of 
Colombia Rodrigo Lara Bonilla’s opposition to Escobar’s election would eventually lead 
to the removal of Escobar from Congress.  The removal of Escobar from office would 
change the way the Medellin cartel dealt with politics.  Previously, Escobar and the 
Medellin cartel would win over their political adversaries with bribes via drug money; 
however, following his removal from office, Escobar renounced his intention of winning 
legitimacy and chose to directly confront what he would later call “Colombia’s political 
oligarchy.”89 
Bribes and political contributions were typical forms of payments from the 
Colombian cartels in order to exert influence and continue with their operation 
unimpeded.  However, when Galan and Lara successfully removed Escobar from the 
political office he won, violence in Colombia would dramatically increase.  In 1984, 
Escobar would order the assassination of Lara, and following the assassination, 
Colombian President Belisario Betancur “decided to give his government’s full approval 
to the extradition of any Colombian citizen whom the U.S. justice system accused of drug 
 
                                                 




trafficking.”90  Following President Betancur’s decision, several high-level drug 
traffickers (including Escobar) would meet in Panama City with Attorney General and 
ex-Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, where the traffickers famously 
offered to pay off Colombia’s foreign debt in exchange for favorable treatment by the 
Colombian authorities.91  Colombian officials would reject this offer; however, this 
would mark the beginning of a dramatic increase in violence from the Medellin cartel in 
order to avoid extradition. 
With the Colombian government actively supporting extradition, Escobar and the 
Medellin cartel would form an organization known as “The Extraditables” and unleashed 
a wave of violence and terrorism that would rock the state of Colombia to its 
foundations.92  During this wave of terror orchestrated by Escobar, “judges were 
kidnapped or murdered, as were state security agents and politicians, while sudden 
terrorist attacks with dynamite wrecked havoc and claimed countless victims among the 
civilian population who had no connection with the extradition problem.”93  The 
Medellin cartel succeeded in striking fear to people with their graphic executions of 
police, military personnel, and even a presidential candidate in order to coerce Colombian 
officials to repeal extradition.94  Escobar would place a bounty of $2,000,000 Colombian 
pesos (equivalent to $1,000 U.S.) for the death of police officers and even orchestrated 
the bombing of a federal building (killing hundreds of civilians) all in the name of 
striking fear in those who opposed him.95 
With the utter chaos in Colombia, elected officials had no choice but to rewrite 
the Colombian Constitution and prohibit the extradition of Colombian nationals.  Alas, 
Escobar had persuaded the Colombian government to ban extradition, but he would do so 
at devastating costs that would lead to his undoing.  At the height of Escobar’s power in 
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1989, Forbes listed him as the seventh richest man in the world.96  However, several 
sequential events would lead to his demise.  First, the assassination of Presidential 
candidate Luis Galan made him public enemy number one in Colombia; furthermore, in 
an effort to kill Galan’s successor Cesar Gaviria, Escobar ordered the bombing of 
Avianca flight 203, which killed 110 people including two Americans.97  Not only did 
this bombing fail to kill Gaviria, but it also made Escobar one of the most wanted 
fugitives in the world.  Finally, the bombing of the DAS building, which killed over fifty 
innocent Colombians, would further enrage the population.  These events, along with the 
election of George H.W. Bush as President of the U.S., who following the assassination 
of Galan, unveiled the Andean Initiative ($65 million in emergency counternarcotics 
assistance), which called for “a major increase in the U.S. military assistance to the 
governments of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to fight their wars against drug 
traffickers.”98  The election of President George H.W. Bush would formally shift the 
emphasis of the U.S. war on drugs from trying to stop drugs from crossing the borders to 
dismantling the cartels and going after narco kingpins. 
 Once Escobar and his cartel were able to coerce the Colombian government into 
writing a new constitution and banning extradition in 1991, Escobar would turn himself 
into authorities, but only “on conditions that he would be given a specially constructed 
prison (known as La Catedral), with his own guards, and many privileges (such as a 
disco, a soccer field, a jacuzzi, among many others).99  Although Escobar was technically 
in prison, he was still able to conduct the operations of the Medellin cartel with minimal 
interference.  However in 1992, the Colombian government decided to move Escobar 
into a normal prison due to reports that he had tortured and killed four of his lieutenants 
while at La Catedral.  As soon as the government attempted to arrest Escobar, he simply 
disappeared from his luxury prison and became a fugitive.100     
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By this time, the U.S. had their sights set on attacking the source of cocaine, the 
Medellin and Cali cartels, instead of simply stopping the drugs crossing the border.  The 
U.S. change in strategy would prove to be the unraveling of both Escobar and the 
Medellin cartel.  Escobar had become an enemy of the state in Colombia due to the 
violence he had caused and also faced persecution form the U.S.  Likewise, an 
organization of disgruntled comrades (with funding from the Cali cartel) known as Los 
PEPES (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) formed and were determined to isolate 
Escobar by destroying his properties and killing many of his closest collaborators.101  
With Escobar fighting a multi-front war, it would be only a matter of time before he was 
apprehended.  On December 2, 1993, Escobar would be killed in a shootout with the 
Colombian National Police (CNP), which led to the eventual fall of the Medellin 
cartel.102   
 Escobar’s reign of terror would last more than eighteen years and during that 
time, he would generate billions of dollars from the cocaine trade and almost single 
handedly turned Colombia into a narco-state.  Although many view Escobar as a ruthless 
killer who would stop at nothing to protect his cocaine trade, others (especially people 
from Medellin) viewed Escobar as a Robin Hood type character who constructed housing 
complexes for the poor and would invest substantial amounts of money to improve the 
neighborhood.  More importantly, Escobar would turn cocaine into a commodity and 
substantially increase the supply of cocaine in the market (this would cause cocaine 
prices to drop from $50,000 per kilo in 1979 to $10,000 per kilo in 1989) and he also 
showed how brute force and violence could influence policymakers to do as he 
pleased.103  Colombia by itself could not defeat Escobar, thus U.S. involvement was 
critical in bringing down the Medellin cartel.  Perhaps more disturbing; however, is the 
fact that the Colombian government aligned itself with both the Cali cartel and Los  
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PEPES in order to defeat the Medellin cartel.  Unfortunately, this would not be the last 
time governments would have to align themselves with criminal organizations in order to 
defeat another criminal organization. 
2. The Cali Cartel: Power by Political Influence 
 If Escobar and the Medellin cartel were flamboyant characters who sought 
attention and the limelight, then the Cali cartel headed by the Rodriguez Orejuela 
brothers were low-key drug traffickers who operated more as businessmen then thugs and 
gangsters.  For this reason, when one thinks of the cocaine trade, one usually thinks of the 
Medellin cartel and Pablo Escobar, which is what the Orejuela brothers had hoped for.  
The Cali cartel did not bomb federal buildings and assassinate presidential hopefuls; 
instead, they paid off politicians to extend their influence to the highest offices in order to 
operate their multi-billion dollar business with minimal interruptions.  Rather than 
declare war on the Colombian state, as well as on the FARC, the Cali cartel and its 
leaders kept lower profiles.104  With the elimination of Escobar and the Medellin cartel, 
the Cali cartel was able to seize control of the cocaine trade temporarily until U.S. efforts 
concentrated on destroying the Cali cartel as well. 
 The Cali cartel preferred to establish political connections rather than challenge 
the state and perhaps the best example of their influence would be during the 1994 
presidential elections.  On July 16, 1994, Luis Alberto Moreno, the campaign manager 
for presidential candidate Andres Pastrana, delivered to the U.S. Embassy in Bogota 
cassette tapes of conversations between the Cali cartel, more specifically Miguel Orejuela 
(leader of the Cali cartel) telling journalist Alberto “Loco” Girardo that the Cali cartel 
had moved $3.5 million into Samper’s campaign.105  On July 19, Ernesto Samper would 
narrowly defeat Pastrana (50.41 percent to 48.06 percent) and in hindsight, the much-
needed funds the Samper campaign received from the Cali cartel probably made the 
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difference.106  Thus by maintaining a low profile and bribing politicians, the Cali cartel 
was able to decide the 1994 presidential election and had directly influenced the outcome 
for the highest official in Colombia.  
 The Cali cartel donated millions of dollars to Samper’s campaign in an attempt to 
forge an informal public-private partnership to manage the cocaine industry.  According 
to Peceny, “the Cali cartel would use cocaine profits to pay for politician’s electoral 
campaigns, and once elected, the officials would acquiesce to the cartel’s control of the 
industry or, at least guarantee light sentences in Colombia rather than extradition to the 
U.S.”107  Although the Cali cartel was able to penetrate into the highest political office, 
the campaign money given to President Samper would lead to their undoing.  Following 
the election, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) senior Colombian official Joe Toft 
would release copies of the cassettes to the Colombian television media, which later 
became known as the narco-cassettes, and surprisingly, the public demanded justice.108  
Toft would resign from the DEA following the release of the narco-cassettes; however, 
he said “the Samper campaign had accepted millions of dollars from the traffickers and 
that the Cali cartel was exercising inordinate control over Colombia’s political and 
economic institutions.”109  The narco-cassettes would cause a year long investigation 
where a dozen members of Congress, the attorney general, and the defense minister had 
been jailed; however, more importantly there was a large public outcry that reflected a 
growing domestic consensus that the corruption of the political system by drug money 
was no longer acceptable.110 
 Drug money pouring into the offices of influential political figures did not start 
with the Samper campaign, which is why the reaction from the Colombian population 
was remarkable.  Violence from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s had skyrocketed 
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and the murder rate reached 80 per 100,000 people (as compared to Mexico today that 
has a murder rate of 14 per 100,000 people) so perhaps the population wanted a change 
and for the government to reclaim the state.111  Thus with pressure from both the 
Colombian population and the U.S. government, Samper had no choice but to defeat the 
Cali cartel and place the leaders behind bars.112  To further pressure Samper and the 
Colombian government to taking action against the Cali cartel, President Bill Clinton 
decertified Colombia without a national security waiver, excluding Colombia from a 
variety of assistance programs not directly tied to counternarcotics and also denied the 
visa of President Samper (only the second democratically elected leader to be denied a 
visa to the U.S.).113 
 Facing mounting pressure from multiple fronts, Samper responded by acting 
decisively to break up the Cali cartel.  The Colombian government launched an all-out 
campaign to capture the cartel’s leaders, and in May 1995, Samper sent more than three 
thousand soldiers “on a drug lord mansion raid, successfully confiscating a multitude of 
computers and cellular telephones believed to be integral to the syndicate’s 
communication network.”114  Furthermore, the U.S. would place a $2 million dollar 
bounty for the apprehension of any of the seven men believed to be the cartel’s elite 
members.  By August 1995, six of these targeted fugitives were behind bars including the 
infamous Rodriguez Orejuela brothers.115  Thus with international assets frozen, money 
laundering now being against the law, and the Cali cartel’s leadership behind bars, the 
demise of the Cali cartel was imminent and provided evidence of the success of the U.S. 
drug certification process in compelling target states to adopt more vigorous antidrug 
policies.116 
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 The Medellin and Cali cartels were both crime syndicates that profited from the 
illicit sale of primarily cocaine; however, one must note the stark differences in how each 
cartel conducted their business.  The Medellin cartel seemed to follow the behavior of 
their gaudy leader Pablo Escobar and decided to directly challenge the state and engage 
in a bloody war with Colombia and its citizens in order to avoid extradition and also 
continue with their lucrative business uninterrupted.  Conversely, the Cali cartel 
conducted their operations in a more businessman mentality and attempted to exert 
influence by bribing politicians in order to continue with their cocaine trade.  The Cali 
cartel’s method allowed them to infiltrate the highest office in Colombia; however, the 
release of the narco-cassettes would prove to be their undoing.  Following the breakup of 
both the Medellin and Cali cartels, the cocaine trade in Colombia would shift from the 
old duopoly system to one where hundreds of small cartels, or “cartelitos” as they are 
known, to appear throughout Colombia.  According to Bagley, “you have got a much 
more decentralized situation with a lot more actors, well over 100, and they lack the 
capital and strength that the Medellin and Cali cartels had.”117  Even though Colombia 
now had hundreds of cartelitos, the primary benefactor of the cocaine trade would now be 
the FARC. 
3. Unintended Benefactors: The FARC 
 The FARC was officially inaugurated in 1964 as a campesino-based, 
revolutionary organization bent on achieving national power and building a socialist 
system in Colombia.118  Although founded in the 1960s, the FARC roots lie during La 
Violencia, which from 1948–1958 cost the lives of over 200,000 people.119  During La 
Violencia, partisans from the Liberal and Conservative parties fought a civil war that had 
less to do about party politics and was more of an explosive expression of peasant 
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grievances and local conflicts.120  According to LeoGrande, “weak governmental 
authority in many areas gave rise to armed self-defense groups of various ideological 
stripes.”121  The FARC was founded by Manuel “Tirofijo” (Sureshot) Marulanda and 
grew out of rural self-defense groups organized by the Colombian Communist Party 
during La Violencia.122  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the FARC engaged in low-
intensity guerrilla wars and understood that they could not seriously challenge the armed 
forces for control of the state, but neither could the armed forces defeat the guerrillas, 
thus for three decades a stalemate prevailed.123 
 The FARC’s social base since its creation depended on peasants in rural areas, 
especially in southern Colombia.  According to Peceny, “the FARC protected these 
groups from appropriation of their land by large landowners and compelled land owners 
to pay fair wages to the peasants.”124  From the beginning, the FARC generated most of 
its profit through kidnapping and extortion; however, with the cocaine trade beginning to 
boom in 1975, the FARC sought to expand their business into the cocaine trade.  Peasants 
began cultivating coca during this time and the FARC continued its tradition of using 
force to compel narco-traffickers to pay market prices for coca leaves and labor.125  
Furthermore, the FARC instituted a progressive taxation system in the coca-growing 
regions, charging a ten percent tax on large production of coca paste and cocaine from 
coca paste, the import of processing chemicals, and the transport of coca by air out of the 
region.126  The Cali cartel decided it would be better to pay the tax and avoid a struggle 
with the FARC; however, Escobar and the Medellin cartel refused to pay these taxes.   
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 In order to invest the billions of dollars in profit from drugs, Escobar invested in 
millions of acres of prime cattle-grazing lands and became a major part of Colombia’s 
agrarian elite.127  According to Peceny, “the FARC attempted to extract taxes from the 
new landlords using techniques it had successfully used with the existing landed elite: 
threatening retribution if those elites refused to pay, or kidnapping for ransom.”128  
Rather than pay the FARC, the Medellin cartel developed powerful military forces that 
attacked the FARC, its allies, and the political group formed by the FARC, Patriotic 
Union (UP).  The paramilitary groups formed by the Medellin cartels pushed the FARC 
almost entirely out of the Middle Magdalena Valley, where it had a strong presence since 
the 1960s, and also challenged the FARC in northern Colombia to include Antioquia, 
Cordoba, Uraba, Puerto Boyaca, and Meta.129  Furthermore, by the early 1990s, the 
paramilitaries murdered more than three thousand UP mayors, municipal council 
members, senators, and presidential candidates and effectively wiped out the UP as a 
viable political actor.   
 In 1986, the FARC had approximately 3,600 combatants in 32 fronts.  Although 
during the mid-1980s through the early 1990s the FARC grew somewhat, the battles with 
the paramilitary groups and its inability to extract taxes from the Medellin cartel limited 
its growth.130  However, with the death of Pablo Escobar and the fall of the Medellin 
cartel in 1993, this would all change.  By 1995, the FARC had become fully entrenched 
in the cocaine trade and began generating staggering profits.  One can argue that the 
strengthening of the FARC was an unintended consequence of a series of tactical 
successes of U.S. antidrug policies during the 1990s.  In essence, the U.S. and Colombia 
eliminated the greatest threat to the FARC in many regions and decreased the ability of 
the newly formed cartelitos to resist paying taxes to the FARC as part of the price of  
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doing business.131  Furthermore, aerial fumigation assisted in deepening Colombian coca 
workers’ support for the FARC against a government that was threatening their health 
and livelihood. 
 With the elimination of its rivals, the FARC began to generate enormous profits 
from the cocaine trade, which allowed them to better equip themselves and also expand.  
Further accelerating the growth of the FARC would be the increase of coca cultivation in 
Colombia.  From 1996–1997, a disease destroyed almost thirty percent of the coca 
plantation in Peru’s upper Huallaga Valley, which cultivated the majority of coca in the 
world.132  In an effort to find a suitable alternative, drug traffickers shifted their crops to 
Colombia’s jungles, experimented with the plants and were able to produce a stronger 
coca leaf with a higher cocaine yield.  Figure 1 illustrates this change. Prior to 1997, Peru 
was the largest producer of cocaine; however, following the destruction of thirty percent 
of its coca crop, Colombia was able to supplant Peru as the largest cocaine producer in 
the world.  Likewise, the decision of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori to have Peru’s 
armed forces shoot down planes that transported coca from Peruvian fields to Colombian 
drug labs further accelerated the shift of coca production from Peru to Colombia.133  By 
the end of the 1990s, Colombia was producing nearly seventy-five percent of the world’s 
coca supply.  Furthermore, the majority of the coca cultivation in Colombia was 
concentrated in the southern provinces of Caqueta, Guaviare, and Putumayo, which have 
been traditional FARC strongholds.134  Thus, the sudden rise of coca cultivation in FARC 
controlled areas in Colombia dramatically increased the FARC’s ability to tax the entire 
coca industry and boosted its income to more than $600 million a year, making it one of 
the richest insurgent groups in history.135 
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Figure 1.   Global Cocaine Production, 1990–2008.136 
 The infusion of funds provide by the cocaine trade allowed the FARC to obtain 
sophisticated weapons on the international market and rapidly expand its forces, which 
allowed the FARC to operate in over 500 municipalities throughout Colombia in which 
more than 130 mayors were known to be paying war taxes to the guerrillas cause in order 
to avoid confrontation.137  By 1999, the FARC had grown from a group of about 3,600 
members operating in thirty-two fronts into a well financed and heavily armed army of 
15,000 combatants operating in more than sixty fronts and active in forty percent of 
Colombia’s municipalities.138 With the increase of funds, the FARC was able to increase 
its combatants and improve their weapons, which helped the FARC inflict a series of 
embarrassing defeats to the Colombian army.   
In the fall of 1996, the FARC attacked thirteen of Colombia’s thirty-two 
departments and challenged the government’s presence in the coca growing departments 
of Meta, Tolima, Cauca, Valle, Santander, Magdalena, Cundinamarca, Putumayo, among 
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others.139  The Ministry of Defense in Bogota acknowledged that the FARC had inflicted 
serious blows against the state, and under intense pressure, President Samper would 
impose a tax on the wealthy in order to collect $500 million which would be used to 
better equip the Colombian Army.140  With the Colombian Army being dealt a series of 
defeats, Samper’s successor, President Andres Pastrana decided to launch peace talks 
with the FARC in 1998.  During these negotiations, Pastrana and the Colombian 
government ceded over 42,000 square kilometers (about the size of Kentucky) to the 
FARC in a move that was sharply criticized due to the state’s inability to provide security 
in this area and allowed the FARC to arrange for kidnappings, carry out executions, and 
sponsor coca plantations.141  The FARC’s acquisition of what became known as 
Farclandia (in southeastern Colombia) clearly demonstrated that the FARC had taken 
advantage of the weak institutions of central authority in Colombia and assistance was 
needed in order to prevent Colombia from becoming a narco-state.142 
By 1998, it became clear that Colombia was a state on the brink of becoming a 
failed state, thus in order to prevent this, President Pastrana issued what he noted as the 
Colombian version of the Marshall Plan, Plan Colombia.143  The details of Plan 
Colombia will be discussed in a Chapter III, but in summary, the FARC’s power has been 
significantly reduced due to the tough stance Colombian President Alvaro Uribe 
(President Pastrana’s successor) took against the FARC along with foreign assistance 
provided by the U.S.  However, as we have seen with the Medellin and Cali cartels, while 
the FARC has been the most recent principal target of both Colombia and the U.S., the 
United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) has become a principal beneficiary.144   
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4. The Rise of the Right Wing Paramilitary Group: The AUC 
 The AUC is a coalition forged in the mid-1990s by Carlos Castano partly from the 
paramilitary groups that were formed by the Medellin cartel in the mid-1980s in order to 
combat the threat of the FARC.145  The AUC has grown from a couple of thousand 
fighters to a well-equipped and trained national force of nearly 20,000 soldiers, with a 
budget in excess of $100 million.146  Although the AUC raises considerable money by 
extracting protection rents from legitimate businesses (racketeering), approximately 
eighty percent of their resources are derived similar to the FARC, from taxing the cocaine 
trade.147  Peceny notes, “while the FARC is largely an insurgent organization that 
engages in criminal activity to advance its political agenda, the AUC represents a fusion 
of paramilitary and criminal organizations, which makes it difficult to discern the precise 
combination of criminal greed and political agenda that drives this group.”148 
The AUC’s growth in the late 1990s through early 2000s can be attributed to the 
seizing of coca-producing territory controlled by both the FARC and another left-wing 
insurgent group, the National Liberation Army (ELN).  According to Vargas, the 
territorial expansion of the AUC has taken place in cooperation with elements of the 
Colombian armed forces as part of a coordinated counterinsurgency campaign.149  
Peceny argues, “The military units that have been working with the AUC to defeat the 
FARC are increasingly trained and funded by the U.S.  Thus the U.S. decision to focus its 
antidrug efforts on funding a counterinsurgency campaign to defeat the FARC has helped 
generate a powerful new player in the cocaine industry.”150  One can further argue that 
the U.S. toleration of the alliance between Colombia and the AUC has allowed the AUC 
to operate with minimal interference.  Peceny further notes, “while it would be extremely 
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difficult to argue that the U.S. intended to strengthen the FARC during the 1990s after 
defeating the Medellin and Cali cartels, it is not as surprising that the U.S. would support 
a right-wing paramilitary group fighting leftist insurgents.”151   
The AUC’s expansion in southern Colombia has undoubtedly stunted the FARC’s 
growth; however, the support the AUC has garnered from the state is interesting.  One 
can argue the 2002 election of President Alvaro Uribe represents the pinnacle of the 
AUC’s power, since many suggest that Uribe has ties with AUC leaders that go back to 
his days as a young politician in Medellin.152  Furthermore, AUC leaders claim that its 
partisans were elected to one third of the congressional seats contested just before the 
presidential elections of 2002.  Finally, during Uribe’s presidency, peace talks with the 
FARC ceased; however, Uribe at the same time raised the AUC to the formal status of 
combatant in the civil war and initiated peace talks with the paramilitaries.153  Although 
Uribe and the AUC have engaged in peace talks, which have led to thousands of AUC 
fighters to formally lay down their arms, the U.S. has been uncomfortable with the peace 
negotiations and on September 10, 2001, the U.S. officially labeled the AUC as a terrorist 
organization.154  Regardless if the AUC has been labeled a terrorist group, it appears as 
though the AUC has become the benefactor of counterinsurgency operations by 
Colombia and the U.S. to defeat the FARC. 
In summary, the story of Colombia from 1975 to today is one that must be told in 
regards to crime and the cocaine trade.  The Medellin and Cali cartels, although 
fundamentally similar, confronted the state of Colombia in different ways.  The Medellin 
cartel and its ruthless leader Pablo Escobar directly challenged the state in order to 
operate free from interference and avoid extradition to the U.S.  From 1985 until 1993, 
the Medellin cartel waged a bloody war against the state while murdering thousands of 
politicians, judges, police officers, and innocent civilians.  The undoing of the Medellin 
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cartel would be due in large part to the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Galan 
and the bombing of Avianca flight 203.  By the early 1990s, Colombia along with a 
group known as Los PEPES and the U.S. would wage a war against the Medellin cartel 
that would end with the death of Escobar and the dismantling of the Medellin cartel.  
Conversely, the Cali cartel attempted to maintain a low profile by bribing political figures 
and directly benefited from the elimination of the Medellin cartel.  The drug money of the 
Cali cartel was able to penetrate to the highest levels of the Colombian government and 
would serve as their downfall.  Following the release of the narco-cassettes, Colombian 
President Samper faced increasing pressure from the Colombian population and the U.S. 
and had no choice but to eliminate the Cali cartel.  An unintended consequence of the 
elimination of both the Medellin and Cali cartel was the increase in strength of the leftist 
guerrilla group, the FARC.  By eliminating the major cartels, the FARC was able to tax 
the entire cocaine trade and generated staggering profits, which helped increase its 
strength and territory in Colombia.  The FARC’s power would be highlighted when 
Colombian President Pastrana gave the FARC 42,000 square kilometers of land to 
operate in.  Following the election of President Uribe, along with assistance from the 
U.S., the FARC’s power has been diminished; however, this led to the strengthening of 
the AUC paramilitary group.  In Chapter IV, we will examine the balloon effect; 
however, based on the history of the cocaine trade in Colombia, we can see that the more 
intently a state focuses on a particular set of actors, the more likely it is that the other 
actors will derive profits from the drug trade. 
C. MEXICO: A COUNTRY WITH A RICH HISTORY IN THE DRUG 
TRADE  
 Recently, it seems that Mexico has been exceedingly making headline; however, 
the reason usually has to do with the violent drug wars that have littered the streets of 
Mexico.  Whether the news is about the death of workers from the U.S. consulate in 
Mexico, the bodies of seventy-two migrants killed in the northeastern border state of 
Tamaulipas, or the apprehension of a high-level Mexican drug leader, the underlying 
theme for all these stories seems to stem from the struggle between the state and narco-
traffickers.  However, the struggle between narco-traffickers and the state did not begin 
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with the election of Mexican President Felipe Calderon in 2006.  To understand the 
struggle between the Mexican cartels and the state, we must view Mexico from a 
historical perspective.   
 The dealing of illicit drugs in Mexico during the 1910s was sufficiently profitable 
to attract powerful politicians such as Colonel Esteban Cantu, who was the Governor of 
Baja California (1914–1920) and also entrenched in the trafficking of opium.155  It is 
important to note that during Cantu’s term as Governor, the U.S. had already passed the 
Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, which was a prohibitionist law aimed at preventing the 
use of primarily opium in the U.S.; however, in Mexico, the poppy culture and its illegal 
commerce were not prohibited until 1926.156  Regardless of the legality, Cantu granted 
leases for opium trafficking in the region he governed for large sums of money.  
According to Astorga, "Cantu was a pioneer of the tradition between revolutionary 
politicians and those who succeeded them of conducting private business from public 
office, regardless of moral considerations and the illegal nature of the activities.”157  
Another example of a high-level Mexican official who amassed a fortune thanks in large 
part to the sale of illicit drugs was General Abelardo L. Rodriguez, who replaced Cantu 
and from 1932–1934, served as acting president of Mexico.  Profits from the illicit drug 
trade were so enticing, even Bugsy Siegel and Virginia Hill from the Luciano-Lansky 
group (U.S. mafia) negotiated with Mexican politicians “in order to be able to finance the 
cultivation of opium poppy in the northwestern part of Mexico.”158   
Astorga further mentions several other Mexican politicians, such as Enrique 
Fernandez among others; however, the importance of these corrupt officials is “to suggest 
that there is evidence that a pattern of control by politicians over criminals is more 
accurate than the contrary thesis that posits the traffickers penetration of the clean, 
transparent, and virginal field of politics.”159  Furthermore, viewing the corruption of 
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high-level political officials as far back as the 1910s shows us that the struggle Mexico 
currently faces along with the massive corruption seen is by no means a new occurrence. 
Astorga breaks the development of the drug trafficking into five stages.  First, 
drug trafficking began with the formation and consolidation of the post-revolutionary 
state.  It is during this stage that the political elite, especially in the northern states (where 
the prohibited commodities are produced and the location of trafficking sites), are 
mentioned as directly controlling drug trafficking.  The second stage began in 1947 when 
the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) and the National Security Police (DFS) were 
established and the army became openly involved with the destruction of plots where 
marijuana and opium were grown.  During the second stage, police forces became the 
structural mediator between the hegemonic political power and the drug traffickers.  The 
third stage starts from the end of the 1960s until the mid-1980s.  During this time period, 
there is a dramatic increase in demand from the U.S. markets for marijuana and cocaine; 
likewise, there is an increase of violence in Mexico between narco-traffickers and the 
police and military.  Furthermore, during this time period, it became increasingly difficult 
for the state to control the new generation of traffickers and their larger number, within 
the socially tolerable limits of violence.  The fourth stage began in 1985 following the 
torture and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena.  Following the murder, American 
authorities publicly named Mexican politicians and high-level police and military officers 
as protectors of drug traffickers.  The murder of Camarena served to remind the U.S. that 
there was indeed a drug war occurring in Mexico.  The fifth stage begins in the early 
1990s with the accelerated breakup of the post-revolutionary political system, which was 
a structure based on the concentration of power in the institutional presidency and one 
political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that ruled for almost seven 
decades.160  The decline of the PRI’s power during the 1990s left the Mexican drug trade 
without a central governing authority, forcing the Mexican cartels to resolve disputes 
among themselves which usually meant by the way of the gun.161      
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Although Mexico has been involved in the trafficking of drugs since the early 
1900s, Mexico became a key player in the cocaine trade following the fall of the 
Medellin and Cali cartels.  During the dominance of the Medellin and Cali cartels, 
Mexican gangs were used primarily as mules to transport cocaine across the border into 
the U.S.  However, with the fall of both cartels in Colombia and the rise of the less 
powerful and more decentralized cartelitos, the Colombians sought alliances with 
Mexican gangs in order to transport cocaine.  According to Dermota in 1997, Colombians 
were shipping cocaine to Mexico in loads as large as eight tons in Boeing 727s, with the 
profits generated by Mexican gangs increasing substantially.162  With profits continuing 
to rise due in large part to the cocaine trade, Mexican drug syndicates divided up Mexico 
into turfs, which gives rise to the current Mexican cartels we see today.163  These 
Mexican cartels would gradually assume responsibilities for the wholesale distribution of 
most of the cocaine smuggled into the U.S.  Likewise, the bloody war between the 
Mexican cartels over control of territories is the primary reason there has been an 
outbreak of violence in Mexico, especially after the election of Mexican President Felipe 
Calderon in 2006.   
According to the Mexican government, there are seven drug cartels operating in 
Mexico; however, the four dominant cartels include the Gulf, Sinaloa, Juarez, and 
Tijuana cartel.164  Figure 2 graphically depicts the location of these cartels and the areas 
that are in dispute, which also tend to be the most violent areas in Mexico such as Juarez. 
Recently, the Mexican cartels have formed alliances creating two large rival cartels 
competing for turf; however, the cartels remain independent organizations even though 
they work together.  The Tijuana cartel formed an alliance with the Gulf cartel, due in 
large part to the negotiations conducted in prison by their leaders.  To combat this cartel, 
the Sinaloa, Juarez, and Valencia cartel formed an alliance known as “the Federation.”165   
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Figure 2.   Mexican Cartel Territories and Drug Routes.166 
These two alliances are the main foreign supplier of marijuana and a major 
supplier of methamphetamine and heroin; however, the U.S. State Department estimates 
that ninety percent of cocaine that enters the U.S. transits Mexico, which generates profits 
of up to $48 billion annually for the Mexican cartels.167  The ability for the Mexican 
cartels to generate such astounding profits has led the DEA to note “the Mexican cartels 
now have command and control over the drug trade and are starting to show the 
hallmarks of organized crime, such as organizing into distinct cells with subordinate cells 
that operate throughout the U.S.168  As a result, Mexican cartels are now the leading 
                                                 
166 Friedman, “The Geopolitics of Dope.” 
167 Cook, “Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” 2.  
168 Ibid., 2–3. 
 45
wholesale launderers of drug money from the U.S. smuggling an estimated $10–25 
billion in drug money to be laundered in both the U.S. and Mexico. 
The Mexican cartels dominance over the state has been further enhanced by the 
hiring of their own paramilitary forces, who tend to be prior Mexican Special Forces 
operatives.  The Gulf cartel was the first to form a group known as “Los Zetas,” which 
served as the Gulf cartels personal paramilitary group.  Due to the fact that Los Zetas was 
created by a group of thirty lieutenants and sub-lieutenants who deserted from the 
Mexican military’s Special Air Mobile Force Group (GAFES), Los Zetas are able to 
carry out complex operations and use sophisticated weaponry.169  Simply put, Los Zetas 
act as hired assassins for the Gulf cartel and also engage in the trafficking of arms, 
kidnapping, drug dealing, and money laundering.  In order to combat the threat of Los 
Zetas, the Sinaloa cartel established its own heavily armed enforcer gangs, the Negros 
and Pelones.170  Los Zetas, Negros, and Pelones serve as the enforcers for the Mexican 
cartels and are also a cause for the increasing violence in Mexico. 
D. CHAPTER II CONCLUSION 
In summary, the drug trade in Mexico is by no means a new phenomenon and one 
can argue that corruption from high-level Mexican politicians dates back to the early 
1900s.  Furthermore the Mexican DTOs have become more powerful since the fall of the 
Medellin and Cali cartels.  The Mexican cartels of today have generated a vast sum of 
profits thanks in large part to the cocaine trade, (along with marijuana and 
methamphetamines) which has also allowed them to increase their power, form 
paramilitary groups to act as enforcers, and directly challenge the state.  Likewise, the 
Mexican cartels can use their resources to corrupt Mexican public officials who either 
turn a blind eye to cartel activities or work directly for them.  Finally, the decline of the 
PRI’s left Mexico without a central governing authority, allowing the Mexican cartels to  
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further increase their power.  Mexican President Felipe Calderon has taken a hard stance 
against the Mexican cartels; however, the drug trade has continued and violence in 
Mexico has reached higher levels of intensity.   
The purpose of this chapter was to show that the struggle against DTOs in both 
Colombia and Mexico dates back decades.  Mexico is often compared with Colombia, 
and as we have shown, for good reason; however, when comparing the two states, it is 
important to identify which stage of Colombia’s struggle you are comparing.  In the case 
of Colombia, two distinct stages can be seen.  The first stage was the Colombian struggle 
against both the Medellin and Cali cartels.  Conversely, the second stage was the 
Colombian struggle against guerrilla and paramilitary groups such as the FARC, AUC, 
and ELN.  This chapter has shown that it is more appropriate to compare Mexico’s 
current struggle with that of Colombia’s initial struggle against the Medellin and Cali 
cartels from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s.171  Both Colombia and Mexico seem 
to suffer from several of the same traits such as mass violence, rampant corruption at all 
levels of government, and an overall lack of control and inability of the state to provide 
security.  Although Colombia also suffered from many of these same traits in its struggle 
against the FARC, AUC, and ELN, these groups have a political agenda that the Mexican 
cartels seem to lack.  As we will see in Chapter III, similar to the Colombia and Mexico 
comparison, many also compare Plan Colombia to the Merida Initiative.  Chapter III will 
outline the U.S. response to deal with the drug problems in both Colombia (Plan 
Colombia) and Mexico (Merida Initiative). 
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III. THE MERIDA INITIATIVE VERSUS PLAN COLOMBIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 On September 8, 2010, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton addressed the Council on 
Foreign Relations and said, “we (the U.S. and Mexico) face an increasing threat from a 
well-organized network drug trafficking threat that is, in some cases, morphing into or 
making common cause with what we would consider an insurgency in Mexico and 
Central America…and these drug cartels (in Mexico) are now showing more and more 
indices of insurgency; all of a sudden, car bombs show up which were not there 
before.”172  These remarks were quickly protested by the Mexican government and 
sparked fears of expanded U.S. military intervention.  Furthermore, the Obama 
administration tried to conduct damage control by saying “the term insurgency should not 
be viewed in the same way we would refer to a Colombian insurgency.  Not an 
insurgency of militarized group within a society that is attempting to take over the state 
for political reasons.”173  It is clear from the reaction to Secretary of State Clinton’s 
speech that the government of Mexico and its elected officials do not want to be 
compared to Colombia or Plan Colombia, due in large part to the thought of U.S. military 
presence, which enrages nationalist sentiment.174   
As we showed in Chapter II, the comparison of Mexico’s current struggle to 
Colombia’s struggle against the Medellin and Cali cartels in the mid-1980s through the 
early 1990s is appropriate.  Due to the comparison often drawn between the two U.S. 
assistance plans, it is important to compare and contrast both Plan Colombia and the 
Merida Initiative in order to understand the method the U.S. prefers in combating the 
drug problem in Latin America.  This chapter will identify where the majority of U.S. 
funds have been used for in both Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative in order to 
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better understand the U.S. approach to the cocaine quagmire.  Whether or not one can call 
the Merida Initiative the new Plan Colombia is not the issue; the issue is whether the U.S. 
approach to the problem in Mexico is indeed the best way to combat the ongoing drug 
war in Mexico.  The first section of this chapter will focus on Plan Colombia and 
describe its failures and successes.  The second section will focus on the Merida 
Initiative, which is the U.S. assistance program for both Mexico and certain Central 

























 Plan Colombia Merida Initiative 
Country  
context 
Population 45 M*; 1.14 M. 
sq. km.; GDP=US$250B* 
(2008); GDP/cap=US$5,174; 
budget expend=US$65B; 
unitary, with significant 
decentralization; 32 
departments, 1,100 counties 
Population 110 M; 1.97 M. sq. km.; 
GDP=US$1,142B (2008); 
GDP/cap=US$10,747; budget 
expend=US$227B; federal, with 32 
states, 1,400 counties 
Problem profile Major guerrilla insurgencies; 
generalized violence; major 
producer & trafficker of illicit 
drugs; limited central 
government presence; 
corruption in police-justice 
system 
Minor regional rebellion; producer 
& major trafficker of illicit drugs; 
rapid upsurge in trafficking 
violence; localized challenges to 
government presence; acute 
corruption in police-justice system 
Policy origins 1999–2000; US proactive in 
policy design 
2007–2008; US reactive in policy 
design 
Policy scope: 
goals & countries 
Internal security & anti-
trafficking; social justice; 
development. Primary= 
Colombia; secondary=Peru & 
Ecuador 
Internal security; law enforcement & 
justice admin.; Primary=Mexico; 
secondary=Central America & 
Caribbean 
Policy targets Insurgency (FARC; ELN); 
self-defense organizations; 
drug crop eradication; 
criminal justice system; 
economic development (e.g., 
crop substitution) 
Counter-drug; counter-terror; border 
security; public security & law 
enforcement; institution-building & 
rule of law 
Time 
commitment 
2000–2006; succeeded by 
similar follow-on policies 
Fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 
2010, with indications of extension 
US financial 
commitment 
US$7.5B; US currently seeks 
reduced commitment 
US$1.4 B announced; approx. 10% 
program costs; --- appropriated in 
2008; negotiations expected in 
Congress in 2009. 
US commitments 
for internal policy 
Reduce drug demand “Genuine partnership”; Reduce drug 
demand; halt: weapons trafficking, 
precursor chemicals, money 
laundering 
Table 1.   Contexts and Characteristics of Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative175 
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B. PLAN COLOMBIA: AN ANTIDRUG POLICY OR A COUNTER 
INSURGENCY? 
 Plan Colombia was approved by the U.S. Congress on July 13, 2000, and from 
fiscal year (FY) 2000 through FY2009, the U.S. funding for Plan Colombia, and its 
follow on, the Strategy for Strengthening Democracy and Promoting Social 
Development, have exceed $7.5 billion in State Department and Department of Defense 
(DoD) programs.176  According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 
“since Plan Colombia legislation and funding were passed by the U.S. Congress, 
Colombia has gone from an almost failed state on the verge of becoming a narco-state, to 
a strong democratic nation with an improving economy and reduced levels of violence.  
This furthers the overarching U.S. objective of reducing the quantity of illegal drugs 
flowing into the U.S.”177  Although the ONDCPs description of Plan Colombia seems to 
be that of an overwhelming success, it is important to state the objectives of Plan 
Colombia and see if these objectives have been met over the past decade. 
 Although there is significant overlap between the U.S. and Colombia in terms of 
objectives to be met with Plan Colombia, there are significant differences that must be 
noted.  According to Veillette, “the primary U.S. objective was to prevent the flow of 
illegal drugs into the U.S., as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economic 
development because it contributes to regional security in the Andes.”178  Conversely, the 
primary objectives of the Colombian government included five areas: to promote peace, 
economic development, anti-drug production and trafficking, reform of justice and 
protection of human rights, and democracy promotion and social development.179  
However, with the increasing influence of the FARC and the election of President Alvaro 
Uribe, the Colombian government’s objective shifted to one primarily focused on taking 
a tougher approach against insurgency groups, especially the FARC and ELN that 
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operated in Colombia and benefited from the drug trade.180  President Uribe increasingly 
equated the guerrillas with DTOs and terrorists and initiated a military campaign known 
as Plan Patriota, to recapture guerrilla controlled territory, which had exceed over 40 
percent of Colombia.  Figure 3 illustrates the height of the FARC’s power in 2002 with 
almost 17,000 soldiers and a vast territory under its control.  Similarly, the U.S. shifted its 
objective from a strictly counternarcotics focus to one that supported President Uribe’s 
fight against leftist guerrillas.  By 2002, President Bush requested, and Congress 
approved, expanded authority to use U.S. counternarcotics funds for a unified campaign 
to fight both DTOs and terrorist organizations in Colombia.181  After 2002, one can argue 
that Plan Colombia switched from a counternarcotics focus to a counterinsurgency focus.   
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Figure 3.   Land Controlled by the FARC, 1998–2002.182 
 Most acknowledge that Plan Colombia’s success strictly from a counter narcotic 
standpoint has been minimal and failed to achieve its desired outcome of “reducing the 
cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent in six years (2000–
2006).”183 Figure 1 shows that Colombia produced 695 metric tons of cocaine in 2000, 
and by 2006, Colombia produced 660 metric tons, which represents only a 5 percent 
decrease in six years.  However, in 2008 Colombia produced 450 metric tons of cocaine, 
representing a 35 percent decrease since 2000.  Although this reduction is still short of 
the desired 50 percent decrease, what is troubling is the fact that the total global 
production of cocaine has decreased from 879 metric tons in 2000 to 865 metric tons in 
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2008, which represents a 1 percent decrease in total cocaine available.  Although the 
cocaine output in Colombia may be decreasing, Figure 1 shows that total cocaine 
production from 2000-2008 has decreased by 1 percent, meaning that Peru and Bolivia 
have increased their production to meet demand. 
 Figure 4 illustrates the global coca cultivation measured in hectares from 1990–
2009.  In 2000, Colombia cultivated an estimated 163,300 hectares of coca, which 
accounted for almost 75 percent of all coca cultivated that year.  In 2008, Colombia 
cultivated 68,000 hectares of coca, which accounted for 42 percent of all coca produced 
and a decrease of almost 60 percent since 2000.  However, one must realize that the 
process of analyzing the cultivation of coca is difficult, because the amount of coca that 
can be cultivated on a plot of land varies over time and between areas.  Furthermore, 
productivity has grown in some areas due to improvements in both farming and 
processing techniques.184  These two figures show that although there have been radical 
changes within countries as far as cocaine output, total cocaine output has been fairly 
stable since 2000.  Furthermore, U.S. government agencies responsible for tracking drug 
trends report that the availability, price, and purity of cocaine in the U.S. have remained 
stable.185  The law of supply and demand tells us that if in fact our efforts decreased the 
supply of cocaine available, then we would see an increase in price; however, this has not 
been the case as evidenced by both the price of a kilogram of cocaine and the supply of 
cocaine since 2000.    
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Figure 4.   Global Coca Bush Cultivation (ha), 1990–2009.186 
 Another aspect of Plan Colombia that is often overlooked but remains a serious 
problem is human rights violations.  The promotion of democracy, rule of law, and 
respect for human rights are shared objectives of both Colombia and the U.S.; however, 
since 2000, there have been many human rights violations that have been reported.  The 
U.S. State Department’s annual report on human rights for 2004 reported that although 
some progress has been made, serious problems remain.  In fact, according to the report, 
there were between 3,000 and 4,000 civilian deaths due to the armed conflict and there 
were instances where members of the Colombian security forces committed serious 
violations of human rights, including cooperation with paramilitary groups.187  Also 
alarming is the fact that Colombia has one of the largest internally displaced populations 
in the world with more than 3 million internally displaced persons (IDP).188  Although 
the number of displaced persons has decreased in recent years, the Colombian 
government registered over 250,000 IDP’s in 2007 alone.  Both the human rights 
violations and the number of displaced persons in Colombia have caused the U.S. 
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Congress to express concerns about how Colombia is fighting its counterinsurgency 
against the leftist guerrilla groups.  However, in the latest certification of Colombia on 
July 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted that the Colombian 
government and armed forces “are meeting the statutory requirements with regard to 
human rights, but the Colombian government needs to do more to address serious human 
rights problems that persist.”189  
 Another part of Plan Colombia that has come under scrutiny is the coca 
eradication efforts of both the U.S. and Colombia.  The Plan Colombia eradication-
spraying program began on December 2000 with operations by the U.S. funded 
counternarcotics brigade in Putumayo, Colombia.190  In recent years, the U.S. and 
Colombian governments have increased their eradication efforts, and in 2007, the 
Colombian government eradicated over 219,000 hectares of elicit coca crops, with 70 
percent of coca crops being destroyed by aerial eradication.191  Although the eradication 
program may appear to be an overwhelming success, coca farmers undermined 
eradication success by taking effective countermeasures, such as moving coca fields into 
jungle areas where eradication is difficult.  Furthermore, aerial eradication has become 
controversial in both Colombia and the U.S. because critics charge that the herbicide, 
glyphosate, has unknown environmental and health effects, and that it deprives farmers of 
their livelihood, particularly in light of a lack of coordination with alternative 
development programs.  Although Figure 4 shows a significant decrease in coca 
cultivation in Colombia, (Figure 1 shows that Colombia produces slightly less cocaine as 
compared to 2000) which seems to indicate that the coca farmers are improving both their 
farming and processing techniques.192  
 Perhaps the greatest weakness of U.S. antidrug policy has been its failure to 
reduce the economic incentives that push poor farmers to provide a steady supply of coca 
to the DTOs.193  As of 2008, Colombian farmers could earn four to twelve times more by 
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cultivating coca than by planting an alternative crop such as coffee, which is roughly the 
same ratio as before Plan Colombia.194  The U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) funds alternative development programs to assist illicit crop farmers in the 
switch from illicit to licit crops and provides assistance with infrastructure and 
marketing.195  Although from 2000 to 2005 the U.S. spent $1.2 billion on aerial spraying 
programs that eradicated hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca, the U.S. only spent 
$213 million on alternative farming development programs meant to provide the coca 
farmers with another source of income and an incentive to turn to a legitimate crop.196  
Furthermore, according to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that 
examined the progress of Plan Colombia, the majority of the USAID alternative 
development projects were not located in areas where the majority of coca is grown in 
Colombia.197  Security concerns are the primary reason as to why USAID assistance 
cannot reach areas where the majority of coca is grown; however, one can clearly see that 
the amount of money spent on eradication as compared to development programs is 
imbalanced and a cause for concern.                
 One can argue that Plan Colombia has not accomplished its stated 
counternarcotics objective; however, the success of Plan Colombia has been in the 
security sphere.  According to Felbab-Brown, good security is not only important on its 
own; it is also a necessary precondition for the success of counternarcotics policies.198  
As Figure 3 shows, the FARC at their height of power in 2002 controlled almost 40 
percent of the Colombian territory and of the 1,099 municipalities in Colombia, more 
than 15 percent did not have a police presence.199  During this time, great insecurity 
prevailed throughout the country and Colombia had among the highest kidnapping and 
homicide rates in the world.  Furthermore, DTOs and FARC members prevented normal  
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economic, political, and social activity and sometimes completely displaced the 
Colombian state.200  By 2000, Colombia was undoubtedly on the brink of becoming a 
failed state. 
As Table 2 shows and as Brands notes, “of the roughly $7.5 billion in aid granted 
under Plan Colombia, nearly 80 percent went to strengthening Colombia’s military and 
National Police and facilitating interdiction.  Since 2000, U.S. assistance has had 
pronounced benefits in the fight against the FARC.  Plan Colombia funds were used “to 
train three elite counternarcotics battalions (approximately 3,000 soldiers) and 30 
Ranger-style strike teams has roughly doubled the number of elite troops that the 
Colombian army can put into the field, while the provision of more than 70 Blackhawk 
and Huey II helicopters has greatly increased the mobility and combat effectiveness of 
these forces.”201  Likewise, the U.S. has provided U.S. military personnel and contractors 
to provide support and advice in the Colombian effort to defeat the FARC; however, U.S. 
forces have not conducting peacekeeping, security, or the complex and expensive 
missions of post-conflict reconstruction in Colombia and remain in an advisory and 
training role.202  From 2005–2008, the number of U.S. military personnel varied from 
136 to 563 while the civilian contractors ranged from 173 to 454; thus the U.S. 
involvement was limited, providing a strong element of legitimacy to the Colombian 
effort.203  The improvements of the Colombian military and National Police, U.S. 
assistance in the form of advisors and training, and the assertive counterinsurgency 
program of President Alvaro Uribe have all helped in dealing the FARC a series of 
staggering blows and diminished their power as an insurgency group.  In 2002, the FARC 
had over 17,000 members in its ranks; however, as of 2009, the FARC had approximately 
8,000 members, kidnappings have decreased from a high of 1,708 in 2002 to less than 
200 in 2008, and their annual income has decreased from $1.5 billion in 2003 to 
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approximately 500 million in 2007.204  Although the FARC still remains a viable threat, 
Plan Colombia has helped the Colombian government reclaim their land and irrevocably 
diminished their power.   
 
Table 2.   U.S. Assistance For Plan Colombia, FY2000–FY2010 (in millions $).205 
Another success of Plan Colombia has been the increase of cocaine interdiction.  
According to Brands, the delivery of ground radar systems, forward-looking infrared 
radar (FLIR) for Colombian intelligence aircraft, patrol boats for riverine interdiction, 
and other equipment and training has greatly increased Colombian interdiction 
capabilities.206  Figure 5 illustrates the global interdiction of cocaine from 1990–2008 
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and it is important to note the dramatic increase in seizures from 2000 to 2008.  In 2000, 
interdiction accounted for only 24 percent of all cocaine produced (207 metric tons) 
while in 2008, interdiction accounted for an astounding 42 percent of all cocaine 
produced (363 metric tons).  Important numbers not taken into account in Figure 5 
include the number of cocaine laboratories destroyed, which rose from 241 in 1999 to 
nearly 2,200 in 2006; the dozens of drug-carrying aircraft that have been captured or 
destroyed; and the arrests and extraditions of narco-traffickers that have increased 
exponentially.207  In Chapter V we will discuss the importance of the Colombian 
partnership with Joint Inter Agency Task Force South (JIATF-S) and how this 
partnership has been able to deal with the emerging threat of self propelled semi 
submersibles (SPSS).  In terms of interdiction, it is difficult to question the effectiveness 
Plan Colombia has had in improving the interdiction capability of Colombia. 
 
Figure 5.   Cocaine Production, Seizures, and Supply to Markets, 1990–2008.208 
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A final aspect that is often overlooked in terms of Plan Colombia is the $240 
million (3 percent of total Plan Colombia funds) in funding used to promote the rule of 
law, judicial reform, and capacity building in Colombia.209  The funds have been 
supervised by both USAID and the Department of Justice (DOJ) and have provided 
remarkable results in the areas of institutional strengthening, training, access to justice, 
public education, and awareness.  As compared to 2000, criminal cases are now resolved 
in 75 percent less time, over 60 percent of cases formally charged have resulted in 
convictions, and there has been an 80 percent reduction in the backlog of criminal 
cases.210  Furthermore, funding from Plan Colombia allowed the DOJ and USAID train 
more than 40,000 prosecutors, criminal investigators, judges, public defenders, and 
technical experts, while also creating 49 new justice houses.211  Plan Colombia has 
helped the Colombian government improve its rule or law, judicial reform, and capacity 
building; however, Colombia continues to be a work in progress as a GAO report states 
that the justice system still has “limited capacity to address the magnitude of criminal 
activity and there still is a culture of illegality that still influences politics.”212 
 In summary, Plan Colombia has had several successes, but it has also failed in 
meeting objectives set forth from the beginning.  According to Brands, “the security 
accomplishments are undeniable, as are the upticks in seizures, arrests, extradition, and 
improvements in the judicial system; however, U.S. policy during this period has 
consistently failed to integrate these programs into a comprehensive counternarcotics 
strategy that fully exploits alternative development programs and domestic prevention 
and treatment initiatives.”213  The majority of funds from Plan Colombia (as illustrated in 
Table 1) have been used to improve both the Colombian military and National Police in 
order to attack the supply side of the cocaine trade.  The imbalance of funding has 
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therefore helped alleviate certain adverse effects of the drug trade within Colombia, but 
has done little to address the deeper factors that drive the commerce.214  
C. THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: A NEW ANTIDRUG POLICY OR PLAN 
COLOMBIA 2.0? 
 Due to the increase in violence in Mexico perpetrated by DTOs, gangs, and other 
criminal groups that has threatened the sovereignty of the Mexican government, the U.S. 
and Mexico announced on October 2007 the Merida Initiative (passed through Congress 
on June 2008), which is a multiyear proposal for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico 
and Central America aimed at defeating the DTOs and organized crime.215  The stated 
objective announced in a joint statement of Mexico and the US for the Merida Initiative 
“is to maximize the effectiveness of efforts against drug, human, and weapons 
trafficking.”216  It is important to note that while Colombia and the U.S. shared various 
objectives for Plan Colombia, they also had differing views on other objectives; however, 
the Merida Initiative joint statement highlighted counterdrug and anticrime efforts of both 
the U.S. and Mexico and imply that both countries share the same objectives.  
Furthermore, Plan Colombia included the U.S. and Colombia and did not provide funding 
for other nations, whereas the Merida Initiative provides funding to Mexico, as well as 
Central American countries including Guatemala and Panama. According to Ribando, the 
Central American portion of the Merida Initiative “aims to bolster the capacity of 
governments to inspect and interdict unauthorized drugs, goods, arms, and people to 
support regional anti-gang efforts.”217   
 According to Brands, the Merida Initiative “is representative of the supply side 
approach to the narcotics trade that has long characterized U.S. drug control policy 
emphasizing interdiction, enforcement, and security measures, with domestic treatment 
and prevention programs, economic development projects, and other alternative strategies 
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assuming a less important role.”218  Table 3 shows the breakdown of Merida funding for 
Mexico from FY2008–FY2010 and during this time, $1.28 billion out of the total $1.3 
billion (96 percent) were funded through foreign military financing (FMF) and 
international narcotics control and law enforcement (INCLE), which are funds primarily 
used for law enforcement, interdiction, and security measures.  Similarly, Table 4 shows 
the breakdown of Merida funding for Central America from FY2008–FY2010 (2010 total 
available but breakdown is not) and from FY2008–2009, $122 million out of the total 
$165 million (74 percent) were funded for law enforcement, interdiction, and security 
measures.  Finally, Tables 3 and 4 show there is a discrepancy between the allocation of 
funds in Mexico and Central America because from FY2008–FY2010, Mexico accounted 
for 85 percent of all Merida funds distributed.  Clearly, the Merida Initiative focuses 
heavily on Mexico as compared to other Central American countries.                  
 




                                                 
218 Brands, Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy, 5. 
219 Seelke, “Merida Initative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues,” 6. 
 63
 
Table 4.   FY2008–2010 Merida Funding for Central America (in millions).220 
Although the Merida Initiative is the largest foreign aid package for the Western 
Hemisphere since Plan Colombia, and many have compared the Merida Initiative to Plan 
Colombia, the U.S. hopes to “forge a new kind of partnership between the U.S. Mexico, 
and Central America and in order for the initiative to be successful, all countries involved 
will have to accept their shared responsibility to tackle domestic problems contributing to 
drug trafficking and crime in the region, including U.S. demand.”221  This statement on 
paper signifies a change from Plan Colombia that will take into account not only the 
supply side of the cocaine trade but also the demand side as well, while also sharing the 
responsibility with partner nations.  However, if one looks at the allocation of resources, 
the Merida Initiative resembles the same supply side approach taken with Plan Colombia. 
 As shown, the bulk of the funding for the Merida Initiative will be used to better 
enable Mexican authorities to contain and perhaps scale down the violence due to the 
bloody war waged by Mexican cartels.  The Merida Initiative is designed to complement 
Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s hard stance against Mexican drug cartels and 
“increase the operational capabilities of Mexican agencies and institutions to allow them 
to break the power and impunity of drug and criminal organizations that threaten the 
safety of their citizens and the stability and security in the region.”222  According to 
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Brands, the majority of the Merida funds have been used to purchase eight transport 
helicopters designed to facilitate the rapid deployment of Mexican troops, two 
surveillance aircraft to give the government greater awareness of cartel activities, and  
also detection and interdiction equipment such as ion scanners, gamma and x-ray 
inspection equipment, and secure communications equipment to allow more efficient 
exchange of information and intelligence.223   
 The Merida Initiative, similar to Plan Colombia, is predominantly a supply side 
approach that focuses on interdiction and law enforcement and allocates few if any funds 
to institution building, anti-corruption, social projects, or economic programs.  It should 
come as no surprise that the Merida Initiative focuses on the supply aspect of drugs 
because since the early 1980s “the dominant feature of U.S. counternarcotics policy is, 
and long has been, a supply-side approach.”224  Further reiterating this point, the 2008 
National Drug Control Strategy issued by President Bush assigns the greatest importance 
to disrupting the operations of major foreign cartels rather than restricting domestic 
demand, promoting social and economic development, or pursuing alternative strategies 
for combating the drug trade.225  The five goals of the strategy are 1) reduce the flow of 
drugs into the U.S.; 2) disrupt and dismantle major DTOs; 3) focus on the nexus between 
the drug trade and other potential transnational threats to the U.S. including terrorism; 4) 
deny drug traffickers, narco-terrorists, and their criminal associates their illicit profits and 
money laundering activities; and 5) assist foreign countries threatened by illegal drugs in 
strengthening their governance and law enforcement institutions.  Table 4 shows a 
summary of both Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative and as one can see, both follow 
the U.S. method of attacking the supply side of the narcotics trade. 
 The distribution of funds for the Merida Initiative may resemble that of Plan 
Colombia; however, it is important to note one distinct difference between the two 
policies.  Plan Colombia, though originally a counternarcotics program, became a battle 
against the FARC and resembled a counterinsurgency, whereas the Merida Initiative is a 
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battle against Mexican cartels that are far more disparate than the leftist FARC faced by 
Colombia.  Guerrilla insurgency is not an issue in Mexico as was the case in Colombia; 
instead, Mexico’s key challenge is a sharp increase in drug related violence beginning in 
2005 that has been escalating in subsequent years.  While the majority of violence is 
concentrated in six of the thirty-two Mexican states where turf wars between Mexican 
cartels are most prevalent, the Mexican cartels are still able to bring violence to the rest 
of the state and directly challenge the sovereignty of the state.  In order to combat the 
threat, Plan Colombia involved hundreds of U.S. troops and private contractors that were 
openly involved in Colombian military operations; however, Mexican officials have 
made it clear that no U.S. military personnel will be allowed to operate in Mexico.226  
Thus, the case of Colombia against the FARC is one that involves a complex internal war 
that has been ongoing since the 1960s where drug production and trafficking play a 
significant role, whereas Mexico is a case of hyper-violent DTOs that directly challenged 
the Mexican government for control of the state.  The inability of U.S. forces and 
contractors to assist the Mexican government is a stark difference between Plan 
Colombia and the Merida Initiative that must be noted. 
Plan Colombia in terms of its ability to promote state security are undeniable and 
we can still see the success of the program with the recent death of the FARC’s second in 
command, Victor Julio Suarez Rojas (aka Mono Jojoy).227  Although the FARC remains 
a viable threat in Colombia with over 8,000 members, the FARC no longer enjoys the 
stronghold it once possessed in Colombia, security in the region has improved 
dramatically, and Colombia is now relying less on U.S. assistance and taking ownership 
of its security.  The Merida Initiative, although intended to be a multi-state effort to 
reduce drug trafficking and improve security in the region, is a policy that focuses almost 
exclusively on Mexico and their fight against DTOs.  Since the election of Mexican 
President Calderon, we have seen a spike in violence in Mexico due to the drug cartels.   
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D. CHAPTER III CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter has shown that Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative 
share the same basic conceptual outline that emphasizes interdiction and the buildup of 
military and police forces rather than on capacity and institution building or demand for 
drugs.  Plan Colombia eventually evolved into a counterinsurgency program set on 
eliminating the FARC from power in Colombia; however, most are quick to declare that 
Mexico does not face an insurgency threat as Secretary of State Clinton mentioned and 
was quickly corrected by both Mexican and U.S. officials.  The official Department of 
Defense definition of an insurgency is stated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub 1 as, 
“an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the 
use of subversion and armed conflict.”228  Furthermore, insurgencies are a type of armed 
conflict, of war between belligerents trying to gain power over one another, thus an 
attempt to weaken or disrupt the functions of government.229  The Mexican cartels may 
not represent a typical insurgency such as an insurgency of ideology like the FARC or an 
insurgency based on religion such as Al-Qaeda; instead, the cartels are an ideology based 
on greed.230  Perhaps Mexican and U.S. officials were quick to correct Mrs. Clinton 
because insurgency is seen as a direct challenge to the state and nobody wants to paint a 
gloomier picture of the dire situation in Mexico; however, Mrs. Clinton may be 
accurately describing Mexico as an insurgency, just not the typical insurgency we are 
used to seeing. 
In Chapter II we concluded that a comparison between Colombia’s struggle 
against the Medellin and Cali cartels in the mid-1980s through the early 1990s with that 
of Mexico’s current struggle is appropriate.  However, by comparing Plan Colombia to 
the Merida Initiative, we are comparing Colombia’s fight against guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups instead of drug cartels.  This chapter has shown that although Plan 
Colombia initially focused on counternarcotics, in the end the plan became more of a 
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counterinsurgency.  Thus, one must ask why should the Merida Initiative so closely 
resemble Plan Colombia.  Chapter II mentions the Andean Initiative, which was President 
George H. W. Bush’s plan to defeat the Colombian cartels.  Perhaps it may be more 
appropriate that the Merida Initiative more closely resembles a strategy that focuses more 
on defeating cartels than a counterinsurgency.  The Andean Initiative understood that 
order to defeat the Colombian cartels, the U.S. and Colombian government had to join 
together to divide and conquer the Colombian cartels.  The U.S. and Colombia first 
targeted the Medellin cartel and after their defeat, concentrated their efforts to defeat the 
Cali cartel.  Following the defeat of the two cartels, hundreds of little cartelitos appeared; 
however, these groups did not have the power or ability to threaten the state as the 
Medellin and Cali cartel had.  Likewise, the Colombian government allowed U.S. 
military forces and contractors to operate in Colombia in order to help defeat the cartels.  
Perhaps the U.S. should partner with the Mexican government and systematically defeat 
the Mexican drug cartels.  The four dominant cartels in Mexico are the Gulf, Sinaloa, 
Juarez, and Tijuana cartels and perhaps a divide and conquer approach similar to the one 
used in Colombia is more appropriate.  Following this approach will not guarantee a 
reduction in cocaine availability, but it may serve to weaken the powerful Mexican 
cartels and in time allow the Mexican state to regain control of its territory, which should 
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IV. AVOIDING THE BALLOON EFFECT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many critics have argued and decades of research on U.S. drug wars have 
demonstrated that U.S. antidrug policies have only a limited impact on the amount of 
illicit drugs reaching the marketplace.231  Critics argue that the billions of dollars in profit 
to be earned are so immense that DTOs adapt and find new ways to supply the market 
regardless of how many resources the U.S. puts in place to diminish the supply of 
drugs.232  The term most often used is the “balloon effect,” which guarantees that as 
cultivation is eradicated in one country or region, it merely reappears in another country 
or region; as some trafficking routes are closed down, new ones open up.233   
The balloon effect means that while U.S. antidrug policies are unlikely to reduce 
the amount of drugs that enter the U.S. market over the long term, they can have a huge 
impact on the distribution of profits from the drug trade.234  As a result, U.S. policy can 
choose who will benefit though U.S. choices of which actors (both among and within 
countries) to attack in the drug war.  Peceny contends that Colombia provides an 
excellent case that highlights three central arguments: 1) the more intently the U.S. 
focuses on a particular source country, the more likely it is that drug production and 
profits will shift to other countries, 2) the more intently the U.S. focuses on a specific 
source country, the more likely it is that private armed actors will benefit 
disproportionately from drug profits, and 3) the more intently the U.S. focuses on a 
particular set of private actors in a particular country, the more likely it is that other 
actors will derive profits from the drug trade.235   
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As discussed in Chapter II, the Colombian case study shows that all three of 
Peceny’s arguments are met.  First, as Colombia became the primary focus of U.S. 
cocaine efforts, Mexico would begin to seize control of the cocaine trade and the majority 
of profits; however, we must note that cocaine production still remains centered in 
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.  Next, as U.S. interdiction efforts concentrated on 
Colombian air and sea routes, we begin to see a loss in profit from both drug cartels and 
the FARC.  Finally, as the U.S. concentrated on the dismantling of the Medellin cartel, 
the Cali cartel became the primary benefactors; once the U.S. concentrated on the 
dismantling of the Cali cartel, the FARC became the primary benefactors; and once the 
U.S. concentrated on the FARC, the AUC became the primary benefactors.  Based on 
Colombia’s experience, one can surmise that since Mexico has become the central focus 
of U.S. drug efforts, even if the Merida Initiative works, eventually another state or 
perhaps another actor in Mexico will supplant the Mexican cartels as the cocaine kingpin.   
Chapter II also focused on the recent history of Colombia and Mexico, and from 
the information presented, we see several common traits between the two states.  First 
and foremost is the lack of control either government was able to exercise over its 
territory.  Following La Violencia, Colombia has had an armed actor, such as the 
Medellin or Cali cartel, the FARC, or the AUC that directly challenged the authority of 
the state.  Several Mexican cartels are waging a war for control of the drug trade in 
Mexico that the Mexican government has been unable to impede.  Likewise, both states 
have allowed these armed actors to exert an inordinate amount of influence through 
kickbacks or other forms of bribes allowing both states to suffer from a high level of 
corruption.  Finally, both countries during their struggle suffered from a high murder rate.  
This chapter will look at several Latin American states that possess the similar traits both 
Colombia and Mexico share and see which state(s) are in the best position to replace 
Mexico as the cocaine capital and could pose a problem in the future.  Chapter III showed 
how the Merida Initiative, although intended to provide funding for many Central 
American states as well as Mexico, has primarily been a plan focused on Mexico.  
Similarly, Plan Colombia focused solely on Colombia, and during those years, Mexico 
was able to become the dominant player in the cocaine trade since little attention was 
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given to it.  For this reason, it is important for the U.S. to have a long-term vision in the 
war on drugs because if the balloon effect holds and the Merida Initiative successfully 
defeats the Mexican cartels, then we should expect a state or another actor to seize 
control of the drug trade and eventually supplant Mexico as the primary player in the 
cocaine trade. 
B. CENTRAL AMERICA: MORE THAN JUST A TRANSPORTATION HUB 
FOR DRUGS 
DTOs have operated in Central America (Figure 6 shows a map of the Central 
American region) since the beginning of the coca trade in the late 1940s.  For the most 
part, Central American organizations have had one role in drug trafficking: to transport 
drugs between South America and Mexico, which is why they are known as 
transportistas.236  Recently, these Central America organizations have taken on the role 
of local distributors, and in some cases, the suppliers of marijuana and poppy (used for 
the production of heroin), as well as importers and suppliers for the raw ingredients of 
synthetic drugs that are manufactured in Mexico.237  However, the transportistas main 
purpose on a regional level remains that of receiving, storing, and transporting the drugs 
safely primarily to Mexico, but sometimes directly to the U.S.   
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Figure 6.   Map of Central America.238 
The rise of the Mexican cartels has also led to an increase in drug activity in 
Central America because the Mexican DTOs are beginning to shift some of their 
operations to Central America.  First, we are beginning to see an increase in cocaine 
seizures in Central America.  As Figure 7 shows, since 2002, we have seen an 
exponential increase in seizures in the area, which suggests that larger organizations (i.e., 
Mexican cartels) have started to use the region to store and move larger quantities of 
cocaine.  However, more problematic is the fact that the increase in storage means there 
is a requirement for more infrastructure and logistics, which leads to the need for more 
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physical presence by DTOs in Central American countries.239  Likewise, the homicide 
rates in the region have been increasing at an alarming rate.  Next, we are beginning to 
see transportistas penetrate portions of the police, treasury, customs, military, attorney 
general’s offices, and court systems in Central America.240  Finally, Central America is a 
region that has a long history with gangs, (or maras, as they are known) which are able to 
flourish in the area due to the severe poverty, lack of basic services or education, and lack 
of control exercised by the state.241  There are dozens of gangs in Central America, but 
the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Barrio 18 are by far the largest and serve as a 
recruiting base for the DTOs.  Central America has become a cause for concern due to 
the increasing influence of DTOs but undoubtedly, the region most affected by the DTOs 
are El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which combined form an area known as the 
Northern Triangle.  According to the United Nations (U.N.), the Northern Triangle ranks 
as the most dangerous place in the world.    
  
Figure 7.   Cocaine Seizures in Central America 2002–2007242 
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1. The Northern Triangle: Violence and Gangs 
a. El Salvador: Home of MS-13 
El Salvador has a population of roughly 7.2 million and for decades has 
maintained a good relationship with the U.S.  During the 1980s, it was the largest 
recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America as its government struggled against the Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgency during a twelve-year civil war.243  
Today, El Salvador is a transit country for cocaine and heroin sent from South America to 
the U.S. via land and sea.244  U.S. officials estimate that approximately 400 metric tons 
of cocaine flows through the Eastern Pacific region and along overland routes.245   
Perhaps the greatest cause for concern in El Salvador is the deteriorating 
security and lack of control the state is able to exercise due to the increase in crime and 
violence related to not only the drug trade, but also pervasive poverty, unemployment, 
and corruption.246  In 2009, El Salvador recorded approximately 4,365 murders, which is 
a 43 percent increase compared to 2008 and results in a murder rate of 52 per 100,000 
inhabitants, one of the highest in the world.247  According to Seelke, there are over 
30,000 Salvadoran youth who belong to gangs such as MS-13 and Barrio 18 and account 
for over 60 percent of the homicides.  The gangs in El Salvador pose a grave threat to the 
state and its security due to their actions, which include, extortion, kidnap, drug 
trafficking, and murdering local rivals, neighbors, and security personnel.  The 
Government of El Salvador (GOES) responded to the threat of gangs with a so called 
“Mano Dura” or iron fist approach, which included the roundup of thousands of youth 
based on their appearance, associations, or address.248  According to Dudley, “most of 
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these arrests did not hold up in Salvadoran courts but served to further stigmatize already 
marginal communities and may have accelerated recruitment for the gangs 
themselves.”249   
Due to the established gangs in El Salvador, the Mexican cartels already 
had an established recruiting base to extend their network.  The contact between Mexican 
cartels and El Salvadorian gangs, such as MS-13, poses a destabilizing threat because the 
gangs can shift from small neighborhood operations to international narco-traffickers if 
action is not taken to prevent this from happening.250  The Mexican paramilitary group 
known as Los Zetas have already had meetings with MS-13 leaders in El Salvador, while 
some MS-13 leaders have already received training from the highly trained Zetas in 
Mexico.251  The influence of Mexican cartels in El Salvador has already led to an 
increase in violence, but more worrisome is the fact that El Salvadorian gangs are starting 
to build relations with Mexican cartels which could pose a significant problem to not only 
the ill-equipped El Salvadorian military, but to the state as well.  
b. Honduras 
  Honduras has a population of approximately 7.4 million people and has 
had a democratic constitutional governance for the past twenty-seven years.  However, on 
June 28, 2009, the Honduran military detained then President Manuel Zelaya and forced 
him to exile in Costa Rica, which led to the U.S. and the rest of the international 
community universally condemning Zelaya’s ouster.252  Although Honduras recently 
elected President Porfirio Lobo as their new President, many countries refuse to 
recognize the Lobo government because of a concern about the state of democracy in 
Latin America and the possibility that the coup in Honduras could serve as an example 
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for other countries.253  The U.S. does recognize the Lobo government; however, 
Honduras remains a country in peril not only because of their political situation, but also 
because Honduras remains one of the most impoverished nations in Latin America and 
has high levels of violence.   
  Honduras, similar to El Salvador, is a transit country for drug trafficking.  
Honduras has become a breeding ground for gangs (similar to El Salvador, the primary 
gangs are MS-13 and Barrio 18) due to high levels of poverty, unemployment, political 
chaos, and leftover weapons from the conflicts of the 1980s.254  Furthermore, Honduras’ 
geographical location (having access to both the Atlantic and the Pacific through the Gulf 
of Fonseca), limited resources, and weak law enforcement presence in vast and 
depopulated areas of the Atlantic coast makes Honduras a target for narcotics 
trafficking.255  In 2009, an estimated 200 metric tons of cocaine passed through 
Honduras, with transshipments facilitated by direct air, maritime vessels, and the Pan-
American Highway, which crosses southern Honduras.   
According to Honduran police intelligence, the Sinaloa cartel has recently 
been working closely with gangs in Honduras to assist in the shipment of cocaine in the 
Atlantic and the Gulf of Fonseca.256  Perhaps more disturbing is the fact that Sinaloa 
cartel members are buying land, building houses and bribing local officials in the Copan, 
Santa Barbara, and Cortes provinces along the Guatemalan border in order to facilitate 
the shipment of cocaine.257  Honduran police also report that Alexander Ardon, the 
mayor of El Paraiso, Copan, works directly with the Sinaloa cartel.  Based on these facts, 
one can conclude that corruption is a rampant problem in Honduras as well.  
Furthermore, the violence in Honduras in 2009 due to gangs, drug trafficking, and 
political unrest resulted in a murder rate of 66.8 per 100,000 inhabitants, the highest in 
the world.  The Sinaloa cartel has rapidly expanded their presence into Honduras not only 
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because of their established gangs (U.S. Southern Command estimates Honduras has over 
36,000 gang members), but also because of the established land, air, and sea drug routes, 
and the inability of the government to exercise control over its territory.  This is a cause 
for concern not only to the Honduran government, but also to stability in the region. 
c. Guatemala: A State Divided by Mexican Cartels 
While DTOs pose a challenge for both El Salvador and Honduras, 
Guatemala is at the epicenter of the drug threat. Impunity, violence, corruption, and 
intimidation of law enforcement are four of the biggest issues the government of 
Guatemala faces.258  The majority of violence is attributed to drug trafficking and 
organized crime, especially along the Guatemalan and Mexican border.  The violence 
caused by Mexican DTOs is due to the fact that two Mexican cartels, the Sinaloa and Los 
Zetas, have been engaged in a bloody turf war for control of profitable drug routes in 
Guatemala.259 
The Sinaloa cartel, which has operated in Guatemala since the early 
1990s, has concentrated its efforts on the Guatemalan-Mexican border and along the 
Pacific coast.  Anti-narcotics agents believe that the majority of cocaine transiting 
Guatemala comes via the Pacific Ocean to the Sinaloa members through one of the oldest 
but surest drug routes.260  Likewise, the Sinaloa cartel work with Guatemalan gangs (U.S. 
Southern Command estimates Guatemala has over 14,000 gang members) in the 
mountainous parts of the San Marcos province where most of the country’s poppy is 
grown.261  Finally, the Sinaloa cartel has a strong working relationship with Guatemalan 
gangs in the Huehuetenango region along the Mexican border to control passage through 
this vital region.262    
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While the Sinaloa cartel has operated in Guatemala for years, Los Zetas 
have only recently begun operating in Guatemala.  Los Zetas have taken control over 
several important junctions in Guatemala including the Zacapa province, a critical entry 
point for drugs coming from Honduras in the east; Peten province, Guatemala’s largest 
state, where they control hundreds of unsanctioned border crossings into Mexico; and the 
Alta Verapaz province in the central highlands, which gives them access to Guatemala 
City to the south, Peten to the north and Zacapa to the east along with the crossing point 
for the Transversal Norte, a trucking route across the north that leads to Mexico through 
Huehuetenango in the west.  Figure 8 shows a map of Guatemala with all of its provinces.  
Along with taking over many areas in Guatemala, Los Zetas have garnered much 
attention due to their brash tactics and violence such as the attack in March 2008 where 
Los Zetas tortured and executed eleven Guatemalan drug members.263  According to 
Dudley, Huehuetenango may be where the battle for Guatemala between the Sinaloa 
cartel and Los Zetas is decided.  Since 2008, the two Mexican cartels have clashed in 
Huehuetenango, which is a critical juncture that provides easy access to the Gulf, the 
Pacific Ocean and land routes through the center of Mexico.264 
                                                 





Figure 8.   Map of Guatemala and Provinces.265 
                                                 
265 Guatemala Fact Sheet, “Map of Guatemala,” 
http://www.larutamayaonline.com/guatemala_facts.php (accessed September 17, 2010). 
 80
A weak criminal justice system, coupled with pervasive corruption, has 
made it difficult for the Guatemalan government to address its deteriorating security 
situation thanks largely to the Mexican cartels hostile takeover of the state.266  Corruption 
in Guatemala is so rampant, even the former Guatemalan President, Alfonso Portillo was 
arrested on suspicion of laundering more than $3 million dollars on January 26, 2010.267  
With a turf war for established drug routes in Guatemala occurring between two Mexican 
cartels, a fragile government, and rampant corruption, Guatemala is a country that some 
may argue is on the verge of becoming a narco-state.268  Mexican cartels already control 
seven of the twenty-two Guatemalan provinces and are the primary cause for an 
increasing murder rate, which reached 52 per 100,000 inhabitants.269  Although U.S. 
continues to have close relations with Guatemala, it is clear that Mexican cartels are 
seizing control of the state and we must act swiftly to prevent Guatemala from becoming 
a narco-state.    
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are the three states that form the 
Northern Triangle, which, thanks to the invasion of Mexican cartels in the region, has 
turned into one of the most dangerous places in the world.  The Northern Triangle states 
share similar traits with both Colombia and Mexico.  All three states are unable to control 
their territory, suffer from a high murder rate (each has a murder rate of over 50 per 
100,000 inhabitants), rampant corruption that reach the highest levels of government, 
high unemployment, and are ill prepared to cope with the problems on their own.  
Likewise, Honduras and Guatemala posses a geographic advantage of having access to 
both the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean, which is a key advantage in establishing drug 
trafficking sea routes.  Although the Merida Initiative was intended for both Mexico and 
Central America, the fact remains that the millions we have given are not enough to 
combat a multi-billion dollar adversary.  Furthermore, these three states’ militaries lack 
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the proper equipment to combat the DTOs, in fact, the Honduran naval and air force just 
recently received the equipment to operate at night.270  As the balloon effect has shown 
us in various cases, and the fact that the majority of our attention is focused on Mexico, 
then the states of the Northern Triangle represent three likely candidates that can supplant 
Mexico as the cocaine capital of the world.  These three states are being invaded by 
Mexican DTOs and represent the greatest threat in Central America; however, they are 
not the only states that have been influenced by DTOs.  Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and 
Panama also represent transport states that have seen an increase in DTO influence.   
2. Other Threats in Central America 
a. Nicaragua  
Nicaragua has a population of approximately 5.4 million people and is the 
second poorest country in Latin America.271  The U.S. has had relations with the 
Nicaraguan government since 1979 when the Somoza government was toppled by a 
revolution led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a leftist guerrilla 
group that maintained ties with rebel forces in El Salvador and U.S. backed counter-
revolutionary forces.272  Although Nicaragua is now a democracy, ongoing disputes 
between powerful leaders, endemic corruption, and weak institutions have undermined 
the state.  Nicaragua depends on foreign assistance provided other states including the 
U.S.; however, Nicaragua has also sought aid from Iran and Venezuela, which is a cause 
of concern for the U.S.273 
Despite the aid received from the U.S., Nicaragua remains a maritime and 
land transshipment route for South American cocaine.  Nicaragua’s poor economy, 
limited law enforcement presence in the country, and corruption provide an opportune 
                                                 
270 Dudley, “Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels, and 
Maras,” 25. 
271 Clare Ribando Seelke, “Nicaragua: Political Situation and U.S. Relations,” Congressional 
Research Service (2008), 1. 
272 Ibid., 2. 
273 Ibid., 4. 
 82
environment for DTOs to operate in the area.274  Likewise, Nicaragua’s geographic 
advantage of having access to both the Atlantic and Pacific create more sea routes DTOs 
can use to ship the drugs.  The U.S. maintains a productive relationship with Nicaraguan 
military and law enforcement institutions, which has led to an increase in interdiction 
efforts; however, the U.S. must ensure that Mexican cartels do not exert undue influence 
in Nicaragua as the DTOs did in the Northern Triangle.   
b. Costa Rica 
Costa Rica, as compared to the previous four states, is a politically stable 
nation with a relatively well-developed economy and a population of 4.3 million 
people.275  Furthermore, relations between the U.S. and Costa Rica have traditionally 
been strong as a result of common commitments to democracy, free trade and human 
rights.276  However, due to Costa Rica’s well-developed economy, as compared to other 
states in the region, the U.S. does not provide much assistance to Costa Rica.277 
Historically, Costa Rica has not experienced significant problems as a 
result of the regional drug trade; however, crime and violence have increased in recent 
years due to Mexican cartels increasing their operations in Central America.278  Although 
the 2008 murder rate in Costa Rica was 11 per 100,000 inhabitants, which is drastically 
lower compared to states in the Northern Triangle, the murder rate has nearly doubled 
since 2004.279  The sudden rise in violence can be attributed to the surge in DTO activity 
in the region and has presented the Costa Rican government with a significant security 
challenge, especially since Costa Rica does not have a military, only public security 
forces.280  Costa Rica does receive funds from the Merida Initiative, which are used to 
                                                 
274 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report I, U.S. Department of State, March 2010, 471. 
275 Peter Meyer, “Costa Rica: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service 
(February 2010), 1. 
276 Ibid., 8. 
277 Ibid. 




improve policing, maritime interdiction, border assistance, and inspection equipment; 
however, Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla maintains that the U.S. funding of the 
Merida Initiative in Central America remains “insufficient.”281  Costa Rica may not pose 
the same security threat as the states from the Northern Triangle; however, Costa Rica is 
still a key transit state for DTOs to ship their drugs to both the U.S. and Europe. 
c. Panama 
The U.S. has had close relations with Panama due in large part to the 
linkages developed when the canal was under U.S. control and Panama hosted major U.S. 
military installations.282  Since the 1989 U.S. military intervention that ousted the regime 
of General Manuel Noriega, Panama has had five successive elected civilian 
governments.  Furthermore, the Panama Canal generates sufficient revenue for the World 
Bank to categorize Panama as having an upper-middle-income economy; however, one of 
the major challenges Panama faces is the large disparity between the rich and the poor.283 
Due to the revenues generated by the canal, the U.S. has not provided a large amount of 
financial assistance to Panama.  Another cause of concern for Panama is the recent 
increase in crime, which can be attributed to drug trafficking (Panama has a murder rate 
of 24 per 100,000 inhabitants).284 
Due to its proximity to Colombia, its geographic advantages, and large 
maritime industry and containerized seaports, Panama is a major transit country for illicit 
drugs from South America to both the U.S. and Europe.285  Recently, Panama has 
become known as the “mouth of the funnel” due to the state routinely reporting the 
highest cocaine seizure rates in Central America.286  The U.S. and Panama have 
successfully worked together to increase interdiction efforts; however, rising insecurity, 
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increased narcotics related crime, and the increased presence of Mexican DTOs have 
threatened to undermine the Panamanian government.287   
Compared to the states mentioned, Panama is the most developed and 
stable due in large part to the business the canal creates.  The Panama Canal generates 
money for the state due to the jobs it creates and it is the route most often used for ships 
to cross from the Atlantic to Pacific; however, due to the decrease of the Arctic ice cap, 
scientist estimate that a Northern Passage through the Arctic could be realized in the next 
fifteen years and would provide a shorter shipping route as compared to the Panama 
Canal.288  With shipping routes reduced, one can assume that the revenues produced by 
the Panama Canal would decrease and could cause a severe financial impact to Panama.  
Although the Northern Passage is still many years away, one must consider the possible 
destabilizing effect this would have in Panama. 
In summary, the Central American states reviewed all have several 
common traits.  First, the government of each state lacks the ability to exercise control 
over its territory.  Next, each state is plagued by rampant corruption and suffers from a 
high murder rate.  However, there are other traits that these states share that provide the 
Mexican DTOs with the ability to operate freely in the region.  Poverty, 
underemployment, weak government, insufficient military and police forces, and weak 
justice systems are all traits these states share and which the DTOs have exploited to their 
benefit.  The Merida Initiative was intended to provide assistance to both Mexico and 
Central America; however, the majority of Merida Initiative funds have been earmarked 
for Mexico and the funds that are provided for Central America are, as Costa Rican 
President Laura Chinchilla said, “insufficient.”  The U.S. must begin to see that these 
states are now not only transit states, but also breeding grounds for gangs and the 
Mexican cartels have already begun infiltrating these states. 
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3. Venezuela: Corruption at the Highest Levels   
 Although not in Central America, one cannot discuss a possible successor to the 
cocaine trade without mentioning Venezuela, which not only is in a position to supplant 
Mexico but can also destabilize the entire region.  According to Killebrew, Venezuela 
presents a unique combination of two challenges: involvement in criminal activity at the 
highest levels of government and ideological opposition to U.S. interests as a major tenet 
of its foreign policy.289  The governing philosophy for Venezuela is Bolivarianism, 
which blends Latin American Marxism, populism, and nationalism that emphasizes self-
sufficiency, patriotism and redistribution of Venezuela’s oil revenues.290  As we have 
seen, states in Central America have been plagued by high levels of corruption; however, 
in the case of Venezuela, corruption starts with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and 
trickles down to all his self-appointed cabinet members.  Venezuela has withdrawn from 
regional counternarcotics agreements; however, more troubling is the fact that Venezuela 
harbors criminal organizations such as the FARC and deals directly with the Mexican 
cartels, but the cause for greatest concern is Venezuela’s relationship with President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Iranian government.  
 Chavez’s support of the FARC has been well documented and allows Venezuela 
to reap benefits from the drug trade.  Venezuela’s ties with the FARC proved to reach the 
highest levels of both actors following the Colombian air raid on a FARC base in 
Ecuador in 2008, which killed FARC deputy commander Raul Reyes.  Following the 
raid, computer material captured from the FARC rebels was reviewed by the 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and intelligence agencies from 
various countries, and showed the deep collaboration between the FARC and high 
ranking Venezuelan officials involved in providing the FARC weapons and resources.291  
Further investigation of the computer files of Raul Reyes showed that Venezuela helped 
the FARC acquire a variety of weapons manufactured in China and Russia, which 
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included grenade launched, missiles, and machine guns.292  Chavez quickly denounced 
the Colombian air raid since it occurred over Ecuadorian air space and also blamed the 
Colombian and U.S. government for planting the computers and fabricating lies about his 
relationship with the FARC; however, following the air raid it was clear that the FARC 
had a state that would harbor them.293  Venezuela allows the FARC to operate freely, 
which is why the FARC has transformed Venezuela into a main drug departure point to 
the U.S., Europe, and West Africa.294  Although the Venezuelan government harbors 
FARC members and allows them to operate freely in the country and establish new drug 
routes, more troubling is the alliance Venezuela has forged with Iran. 
 Venezuela’s corruption and blatant criminal activity created an entry point for 
Iran, which according to the U.S. government is the world’s most active state exporter of 
terrorism, to enter into the hemisphere.295  According to Killebrew, Venezuelan and 
Iranian relations involve the unmonitored international movement of drugs, money, 
weapons, and people.296  One of the unmonitored movements involve the Air Iran flights 
that started in 2007 that fly from Tehran to Caracas with a stopover in Damascus, Syria.  
Although the flight only carries “official passengers,” the lackadaisical immigration 
controls have alarmed U.S. officials who point out that several travelers from Syria, 
Yemen, Iran, and other Middle Eastern states known to harbor terrorists were given 
Venezuelan passports.297  In fact, in 2008, Turkish authorities intercepted a shipping 
container that was labeled “tractor parts,” but in reality the container had enough bomb 
making chemicals and laboratory equipment to set up an explosives lab.298  Also of 
concern is the Iranian bank (the International Development Bank) that was opened in 
Caracas, which experts say “is designed to facilitate the funding of terrorist organizations 
and to circumvent financial sanctions imposed by the U.S., the European Union (E.U.), 
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and the U.N.299  Venezuela and Iran have had relations since the 1960s when both states 
co-founded the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); however, the 
relationship today is troublesome due to the fact that Venezuela is a state known to 
harbor criminals such as the FARC and its only a matter of time until Venezuela begins 
harboring terrorist groups such as Hezbollah.   
 Venezuela undoubtedly is a state that poses several challenges to the U.S. not 
only because of its different ideology, but because the corrupt government, starting with 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, harbor known criminal and terrorist groups.  
Likewise, Venezuela is forging alliances with Latin American countries such as Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, and Ecuador who are all beginning to or have shifted their political ideologies 
to the left.  However, the gravest threat to the U.S. is not the drugs that flow seamlessly 
from the Venezuelan coast, but the relationship Venezuela has with Iran and the ability of 
Venezuela to harbor Middle Eastern terrorist groups in the hemisphere who now have a 
safe haven to launch potential attacks to the U.S.  Thus, Venezuela is following a path 
that could lead to a potential chaotic free for all in the state where criminal and terrorist 
groups operate freely and wreck havoc in the western hemisphere.   
C. CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION 
 In summary, this chapter has focused on the theory known as the balloon effect, 
which essentially states that the more intently the U.S. focuses on a particular state/actor, 
the more likely drug production and profits will shift to another state/actor.  The balloon 
effect helps explain why the cocaine profits have shifted within Colombia and from 
Colombia to Mexico.  Colombia became the primary target for U.S. drug intervention 
with Plan Colombia; however, the problem simply shifted to Mexico, which now 
generates the greatest profit from the cocaine trade.  Today, Mexico is the primary 
beneficiary of the Merida Initiative and receives the majority of funds; however, what 
happens if the Merida Initiative succeeds and indeed weakens the Mexican cartels?  We 
must not forget that there continues to be a high demand for cocaine not only in the U.S. 
but also in Europe and the drug business generates almost $40 billion annually.  With 
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such a staggering fortune that can be realized, another state or actors (perhaps even 
within Mexico) will likely attempt to seize control of the cocaine industry.  The states 
from the Northern Triangle are a cause of concern due to their established gangs already 
in the area and the fact that they are playing such an important role in the drug trade 
today.  However, for reasons mentioned, Venezuela is also a prime candidate to seize 
control of the cocaine trade since there is a government in place that supports criminal 
and terrorist actors.  Today, Mexico generates the greatest attention due to the estimated 
28,000 people who have been murdered since Mexican President Felipe Calderon took 
office in 2006 and the country’s close proximity to the U.S.  Clearly the U.S. must focus 
its attention on Mexico in order to prevent it from becoming a narco-state; however, we 
must also consider future potential threats and assess the situation not only in terms of the 
present but also in the future.  If the balloon effect theory holds, then another state/actor 
will seize control of the cocaine trade; however, as this chapter has shown, our assistance 
and policies in the Northern Triangle and Venezuela are insufficient.  Thus it is in our 
best interest to analyze future potential threats and attempt to prevent the state(s) from 
becoming the new cocaine kingpin.      
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V. CONCLUSION, THREATS TO U.S. HOMELAND, U.S. 
RESPONSE TO MEXICO, AND WAY FORWARD 
A. CONCLUSION 
President Richard Nixon may have coined the phrase “the war on drugs” in 1969, 
but in reality, the U.S. has been engaged in a fight against illicit narcotics since 
prohibition.  Although the actors and states may have changed, the end state remains the 
same: while there is a demand and a market for illicit drugs such as cocaine, there will be 
someone who will supply illicit drugs as long as it remains profitable.  The drug business 
yields profits in excess of $40 billion annually, so as long as such a staggering profit can 
be made, there will continue to be a war on drugs.  This thesis focused primarily on the 
latest battlefront in this war: the cocaine trade and how the cocaine capital has shifted 
from Colombia to Mexico.   
The first chapter stated our proposed topic, the need for policymakers to 
understand the war on drugs, and the methodology used.  A literature review and 
background of the cocaine trade introduced some of the more important topics such as the 
Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia, the rise of the Mexican cartels, and the U.S. 
response to the rising threat in both Colombia and Mexico with Plan Colombia and the 
Merida Initiative.   
The second chapter provided a detailed history of the key players and groups in 
the cocaine trade since prohibition.  The first section provided an overview of how the 
cocaine trade evolved following prohibition until the early 1970s.  The second section 
discussed how Colombian DTOs, more specifically the Medellin and Cali cartels, were 
able to revolutionize and commoditize the cocaine business, earn billions of dollars in 
profits, and almost turn Colombia into a narco-state.  We also discussed groups such as 
the FARC and the AUC who were able to benefit from the U.S. and Colombian policies 
set to destroy the two cartels.  The third section highlighted the beginning of the drug 
problem in Mexico, which dates back to the early 1900s.  Finally, we described the key 
Mexican cartels, more specifically, the Gulf, Sinaloa, Juarez, and Tijuana cartel, who 
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seem to dominate the news headlines and have supplanted the Colombian cartels while 
becoming the most profitable and ruthless DTOs.  The purpose of this chapter was to 
show that the drug problem in each state did not appear overnight; instead, these states 
have been fighting DTOs for decades.  Likewise, both Colombia and Mexico share many 
common traits such as an inability to control or provide security for the state, mass 
violence, and rampant corruption that reaches all levels of government.  Finally, although 
Mexico is often compared to Colombia, it is important to specify during what time frame 
the comparison should be made.  Colombia has faced two different actors, 1) the 
Medellin and Cali cartels and 2) guerrilla and paramilitary groups such as the FARC, 
AUC, and ELN.  Thus when comparing the two states, it is more appropriate to compare 
Mexico’s current struggle against Mexican cartels to Colombia’s struggle with the 
Medellin and Cali cartels.    
The third chapter focused on how the U.S. has approached the war against DTOs 
in both Colombia and Mexico.  The first section discussed Plan Colombia and both the 
successes and failures of the plan.  The second section discussed the Merida Initiative, 
which is the U.S. approach to combating the increasing threat from the Mexican cartels.  
Finally, we discussed whether or not it is appropriate to compare the Merida Initiative to 
Plan Colombia.  Plan Colombia was initially a counternarcotics effort; however, in the 
end the plan became more of a counterinsurgency to help defeat the FARC.  Thus if we 
want defeat the Mexican cartels, perhaps the Merida Initiative should resemble the U.S. 
and Colombian efforts to defeat both the Medellin and Cali cartels in the early 1990s 
instead of resembling Plan Colombia.  
The fourth chapter discussed the balloon effect, which essentially states that the 
more intently the U.S. focuses on a particular state/actor, the more likely it is that drug 
production and profits will shift to another state/actor.  The balloon effect applies to this 
thesis since the U.S. focused the majority of its funds and attention to Colombia and the 
problem seems to have shifted from Colombia to Mexico.  This should be a cause for 
concern since the U.S. is now shifting both its funds and efforts to Mexico and we want 
to avoid another state/actor from seizing control of the cocaine trade.  The first section 
described the Central American countries that make up the Northern Triangle: El 
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Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.  The second section discussed Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, and Panama and how these countries can possibly supplant Mexico as the new 
cocaine capital.  The final section described perhaps the gravest threat to the region not in 
terms of narco-trafficking, but in terms of stability: Venezuela.  Venezuela has ties to the 
FARC, but of more concern is its relationship with Iran, which could allow groups such 
as Hezbollah or other Middle Eastern terrorist groups access to the Western hemisphere.  
The objective of this chapter was to show that although Mexico remains the immediate 
threat and remains the focal point of the Merida Initiative, the U.S. must maintain a long-
range vision in order to avoid the balloon effect once again.  The Mexican cartels have 
been able to expand to many other states, and as we have shown, many of these states 
share the same characteristics as both Colombia and Mexico.  Thus the U.S. should pay 
particular attention to the states that form the Northern Triangle due to the influence 
Mexican DTOs have exerted recently, and to Venezuela due to its ties with the FARC, 
Mexican cartels, and Iran.  As we have shown, the Merida Initiative fails to adequately 
address other states/actors that can supplant Mexico should the Merida Initiative succeed.  
B. THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 
If one were to consider the primary threat to the U.S. homeland, most people 
would agree that terrorism (from both domestic and international actors) poses the most 
immediate and serious threat to our security.  Although terrorists do pose a significant 
threat to the U.S. as demonstrated by the horrendous attacks on 9/11 and the failed 
Christmas Day and Times Square Bombings, Mexico and its war on drugs is quickly 
becoming a substantial threat to the U.S. that must become a priority.  Kidnappings, 
beheadings, deadly shootouts with local, state, and federal officials, money laundering, 
and mass violence is not the setting for a Hollywood action movie or even Iraq or 
Afghanistan; instead, this is a description of Mexico and its continuous struggle against 
Mexican cartels.  President Barack Obama released the latest National Security Strategy 
(NSS) in May 2010, which outlines the major national security concerns for the U.S. and 
how the administration plans to deal with them; however, the NSS only briefly mentions 
Mexico in the following passage: “Stability and security in Mexico are indispensable to 
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building a strong economic partnership, fighting the illicit drug and arms trade, and 
promoting sound immigration policy.”300  With the Mexican drug war barely mentioned 
in the NSS and the fact the balloon effect states that another state/actor will fill the void 
once the Mexican cartels lose their power, one must ask themselves why should the U.S. 
invest billions of dollars to fight a war that seems unwinnable?  This section will examine 
the threats the drug war in Mexico poses for the U.S. and why it is in our best interest to 
formulate a plan that will help Mexico regain control over its territory.   
The U.S.-Mexican border is 1,969 miles long and is the world’s most frequently 
crossed international border, with over 250 million people moving across it.301  Due to 
our proximity with Mexico, the shift of the cocaine epicenter has caused growing 
concerns due to the significant threat the Mexican war on drugs poses to the U.S. 
homeland.  As mentioned in Chapter II, since 2006 Mexico has experienced an 
accelerating increase in drug related violence and a corresponding deterioration of 
internal security.  Not surprisingly, Mexico’s inability to cope with the cartels has led to 
an increase in violence, kidnappings, and illegal immigration to spillover into the U.S., 
especially in border states such as Texas, Arizona, and California.  In a recent interview, 
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said, “I think now we have seen some 
spillover.  There’s always been a certain amount of violence between DTOs and the like 
along the border.  But now, for example in cities like Phoenix, there’s an increase in 
kidnappings that I relate to this increase in the drug war in Mexico.”302  Although the fear 
of the violence spilling into the U.S. poses an immediate threat, there are other threats 
such as an increase in drug supply, the self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS) threat, 
and the porus U.S.-Mexican border, we must consider in order to protect the U.S. 
homeland.   
As previously stated, due to Mexico’s proximity to the largest consumer of 
cocaine (the U.S.), the geographic advantage of Mexico being surrounded by both the 
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Pacific and Atlantic Ocean, and the implementation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, it is no wonder why cocaine seems to flow almost 
effortlessly from Mexico to the U.S.  According to U.S. Coast Guard estimates, 65 
percent of all cocaine flows through Central America into Mexico and eventually into the 
U.S. by land routes while the remaining 35 percent flow via sea routes in both the Pacific 
and Caribbean by traditional narco carrying go-fast vessels and more recently by nearly 
undetectable self propelled semi-submersibles known as SPSS’s.  Go-fast vessels are the 
transportation method of choice for DTOs due to their relatively cheap cost 
(approximately $50,000).  A go-fast vessel is typically built of fiberglass, has four 
outboard engines and is usually about 30 feet long.  The boat can reach speeds in excess 
of 50 knots and is usually painted ocean blue in order to make detection by aircraft more 
difficult.  DTOs typically send 5–10 go-fast vessels with about one ton of cocaine from 
Colombia simultaneously in order to confuse U.S. and other allied ships and also increase 
the likelihood that several of the go-fast boats will reach Mexico.303   
Due to the amount of revenue generated from the cocaine trade, DTOs are able to 
invest in the construction of SPSSs, which prove to be a more efficent method of 
shipping cocaine to Mexico.  Although these semi-submersibles can transit at a speed no 
greater than 8 knots, these subs are nearly undetectable except for their snorkel, which 
rises about two feet above water.  The SPSSs are relatively expensive (approximately 
$1,000,000); however, they are capable of carrying up to eight tons of cocaine (street 
value of $200,000,000) and have become an increasingly popular method of distribution 
by the DTOs.  SPSS vessels represent an increasingly significant threat to safety and 
security due to their stealthiness, payload, and distances the vessel can travel without 
support.304  The near undetectablity of these vessels poses an even greater threat should 
drug traffickers choose to line trafficking routes and methods with a different payload.  
Having already discussed the Venezuelan ties with DTOs, the FARC, and Iran, it is 
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plausible that DTOs could simply rent an SPSS to a terrorist organization who can then 
outfit the SPSS with a nuclear weapon or explosive instead of drugs.305  Although this 
scenario may seem improbable, the alliances are in place for such an attack to be feasible. 
A final problem that must be considered is the porous border which allows not 
only for drugs to flow from Mexico to the U.S., but what is often overlooked is the steady 
supply of weapons that flows from the U.S. to Mexico and into the hands of the Mexican 
Cartels.  With over 90 percent of America’s cocaine traveling through Mexico and with 
the U.S. supplying over 90 percent of the guns used in drug violence in Mexico, there is 
strong evidence that a problem lies at the porous border.306  The cartels are able to benefit 
from the border because it not only allows them to transport their drugs across the border 
with a high success rate, but it also provides them with an avenue to purchase weapons 
for their armies and also smuggle billions in drug money across the border.      
C. COMBATING THE THREAT 
Joint Inter Agency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) is the interagency organization 
that leads the fight against narcotics flowing via the sea.  By their estimates, a ship 
conducting counter drug (CD) operations has a 9 percent detection rate of a narco-
carrying vessel within two hundred nautical miles; if a ship has a helicopter detachment 
the detection rate increases to a 20 percent detection rate; and finally if a ship has a 
helicopter detachment and works with intelligence gathered by a maritime patrol aircraft 
(MPA) the detection rate increases to 70 percent.  JIATF-S has been able to build an 
unparalleled network of law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets to focus on 
detecting the movements and shipments of DTOs and form a fully integrated interagency 
command.307  Within the JIATF-S organizational structure, representatives from 
Department of Defense (DoD), Homeland Security, and the Justice Department, along 
with U.S. Intelligence Community liaisons, and international partners work as one team 
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to stop the flow of narcotics via sea.308  However, as Figure 2 shows, there are many drug 
routes DTOs have created in order to avoid detection and JIATF-S only has a few assests 
patrolling the Pacific and Caribbean waters, which makes detection very difficult.       
In order to combat the smuggling of cocaine via land routes, President George W. 
Bush signed the Secure Fence Act in October 2006 calling for a double reinforced fence 
along 700 miles of border where illegal drug trafficking and immigration were most 
common.309  The fence, which today stretches more than 580 miles, is made up of several 
different barrier projects, which include a physical structure in some areas while in others 
it is a virtual fence made up of mobile towers, radar, and cameras that are linked to a near 
real time projection of the frontier.310  Although the fence covers approximately one-third 
of the entire U.S.-Mexico border, it has not had a significant impact on reducing the 
amount of cocaine flowing to the U.S. or increasing cocaine interdiction.  
The secure fence initiative has not delivered the expected results; however, the 
U.S. has established several fusion centers in key states such as Arizona and Texas, 
which have been more promising.  One of the most prominent fusion centers created to 
combat the flow of cocaine across the U.S.-Mexico border is the El Paso Intelligence 
Center (EPIC).  EPIC’s purpose is to provide real-time intelligence that helps law 
enforcement target the U.S. distribution networks of the Mexican Drug cartels.  EPIC is 
led by the DEA and is staffed by fifteen federal agencies from the Department of 
Homeland Security, Justice, Defense, Transportation, as well as state, county, and soon 
municipal law enforcement organizations.311  According to DEA Chief of Intelligence 
Anthony Placido, “hundreds of special agents, intelligence analysts, computer and 
communications specialists, translators, technology experts, and support staff sift through 
complex, seemingly unrelated pieces of information.”312   
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With such a robust organization, no other agency in the U.S. provides real-time 
tactical support to the law enforcement community with such a wide range of database 
queries.313  As a fusion center, EPIC is able to collect, analyze, and share with law 
enforcement organizations sensitive information that turns suspicion into probable cause, 
contraband into evidence, and suspects into criminal defendants.  Although EPIC tends to 
focus on the southwest border, according to DEA administrator, Karen Tandy, “EPIC is 
building a history of information sharing that extends into the heartland of America and 
provides support to police in all 50 states, the District of Colombia, Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands, and Guam.  This information sharing is vital to officer safety, interdiction 
efforts, and investigations everywhere.”314        
The U.S. has implemented programs such as the secure fence inititative; however, 
we must not forget that the border we share with Mexico is almost 2,000 miles long, thus 
providing security throughout the border is a daunting task.  Recently, California, 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas (the U.S. states that share a border with Mexico) 
agreed to send 1,200 National Guard forces on August 1, 2010, for a year long 
deployment to prevent illegal border crossings, smuggling, and assist in criminal 
investigations.315  Even with the augment from the National Guard, Arizona Governor 
Jan Brewer argues, “the deployment is not enough nor tied to a strategy to 
comprehensively defeat the increasingly violent drug and alien smuggling cartels that 
operate in Arizona on a daily basis.”316  Finally, although U.S. military forces may not be 
used for law enforcement, Congress created a “drug exception” to the Posse Comitatus 
Act that authorizes the Secretary of Defense to “make available any military equipment 
and personnel necessary for operation of said equipment for law enforcement 
purposes.”317  Thus, the Army can provide equipment, training, and expert military 
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advice to civilian law enforcement agencies as part of the total effort in the war on 
drugs.318  Augmenting the border with the U.S. military may be an option but we must 
realize that border protection is not a defined role of the military and law enforcement 
officials may be better suited to handle this problem.          
In summary, the shift of the cocaine capital from Colombia to Mexico has 
threatened the security of the U.S. homeland.  We have seen an increase in violence along 
the border as demonstrated by the killing of two U.S. Consulate employees in Juarez, 
Mexico, on March 13, 2010, which serves as a chilling reminder that the state we share 
our southern border with is engaged in a vicious and bloody battle with the Mexican 
Drug Cartels.  Furthermore, Phoenix is now the kidnapping capital of the U.S. thanks in 
large part to the cartels on both sides of the border.319  Also, we have seen an increase in 
illegal migration from displaced Mexicans, particularly from cities such as Juarez, 
Matamoros, and Tijuana, into the U.S.  However, we must understand that the spillover 
of violence is only part of the threat posed by the Mexican drug war to the U.S. 
homeland.  The porous U.S.-Mexican border allows for drugs, weapons, and money to 
flow seamlessly from Mexico to the U.S. and vice-versa causing U.S. border states to 
deploy the National Guard to provide security against the increasing threat from Mexican 
DTOs.  Likewise, the profits made by the DTOs allow them to invest in new methods to 
transport their drugs.  The latest tool used by the DTOs is the nearly undetectable SPSS, 
which can carry up to eight tons of cocaine; however the greater threat to the U.S. is not 
the smuggling of drugs, but the ability of a terrorist group to outfit the SPSS with 
explosives or a nuclear weapon and attack the U.S. coast.  This threat is made even more 
viable due to the alliances between Venezuela, DTOs, the FARC, and Iran.  As one can 
see, the shift of the cocaine capital and the war on drugs in Mexico has threatened the 
U.S. homeland in a multitude of ways, least of which is the smuggling of drugs.   
 The Merida Initiative was implemented in 2008; however, the situation in Mexico 
appears to worsen by the day.  As mentioned in Chapter III, perhaps the Merida Initiative 
is not the correct approach in combating the Mexican cartels.  Instead, the U.S. should set 
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both short-term and long-term goals to combat the threat not only from Mexico, but as 
Chapter IV mentions, to prevent the balloon effect.  As it stands, the U.S. method for 
combating the threat from Mexican cartels to the U.S. homeland is inadequate.  Although 
JIATF-S does partner with many Latin American states, the task of patrolling the 
Caribbean waters that are littered with dozens of drug trade routes seems overwhelming.  
Likewise, EPIC is a fusion center that gathers pertinent intelligence; however, the U.S. 
must improve its data sharing capabilities and we must also seek to share intelligence 
with partner states in the region that can assist in the apprehension of DTO members.  
The sharing of data with foreign states could be problematic, since as Chapter II and IV 
highlighted there is rampant corruption in the area.  If the Merida Initiative fails to work 
and the situation in Mexico irrevocably worsens, then the U.S. seems ill prepared to 
protect its homeland.  Likewise, if the Merida Initiative succeeds and the Mexican cartels 
are weakened or defeated, we can expect that the balloon effect will occur and another 
state/actor will assume control of the cocaine trade.  Regardless of who the next 
state/actor is, the U.S. does not seem prepared to deal with a new threat that will 
inevitably rise in order to profit from a $40 billion industry.  
D. WAY FORWARD 
As mentioned in Chapter III, Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative continue 
the traditional U.S. approach in combating the narco-traffickers: a supply side attack that 
focuses on interdiction, enforcement, and security measures, with domestic treatment and 
prevention programs, source-country economic development projects, and other 
alternative strategies assuming considerably less importance.320  In the case of Colombia, 
although the desired reduction in drug production and supply were not met, it is hard to 
argue the success of Plan Colombia from a security perspective.  As we have seen, 
Colombia has been a state at war against DTOs since the mid-1970s and prior to 2002, 
the leftist guerrilla group, the FARC, controlled almost 40 percent of the state and 
threatened to turn Colombia into a narco-state.  Today, thanks in large part to Plan 
Colombia and U.S. assistance, Colombia has been able to push the FARC to the brink of 
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defeat and has reclaimed the majority of its territory.  Colombia continues to be a work in 
progress and the U.S. continues to provide assistance; however, U.S. involvement has 
scaled back recently and Colombia has taken ownership for providing security within its 
borders.  
The Merida Initiative has often drawn comparison to Plan Colombia; however, we 
must realize that although Plan Colombia was successful from a counterinsurgency 
standpoint, it does have several weaknesses that need to be addressed in the case of 
Mexico.  As Chapter III concluded, the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia are similar 
in structure; however, the problem arises that we are forming a plan in Mexico that in 
essence became a counterinsurgency in Colombia.  In Secretary Clinton’s speech, she 
compared Mexican DTOs to an insurgency, which drew stark criticism from both U.S. 
and Mexican officials.  Although Mexico may not resemble the traditional insurgency we 
see in other areas, clearly, the Mexican DTOs pose a grave threat to the Mexican 
government and the situation in Mexico could be viewed as uncontrollable by the state’s 
inability to provide security over its territory, which is the central duty of a state.  Instead 
of comparing the Merida Initiative to Plan Colombia, perhaps it is more appropriate to 
compare Mexico’s struggle with Mexican cartels with Colombia’s struggle against the 
Medellin and Cali cartels. 
Colombia in the 1980s through the early 1990s faced a threat from both the 
Medellin and Cali cartel that almost converted Colombia into a narco-state.  However, 
with U.S. assistance in the form of funding and military force, the Colombian 
government was able to defeat both the Medellin and Cali cartels.  Mexico faces rampant 
violence from the four primary cartels and the U.S. has provided assistance in the form of 
funding; however, a distinct difference is the fact that Mexican officials have made it 
clear that they do not want U.S. military forces in their territory except those serving in a 
training capacity.  According to public law (P.L. 106-246) issued by Congress in July 
2000, the U.S. has a congressionally mandated force cap of eight hundred military 
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personnel and six hundred American military contractors in Colombia.321  Furthermore, 
the Colombian government has granted access to the U.S. military to use certain 
Colombian military bases, which allows the U.S. to fly reconnaissance aircraft in the area 
and provide greater intelligence.322   
It is important for the U.S. and Mexico to come to an agreement and allow U.S. 
military personnel, U.S. military contractors, and DEA agents to operate jointly with the 
Mexican military and police forces.  Chapter two highlighted the mass corruption of the 
Mexican local, state, and municipal police forces, which is why the Mexican Army has 
become the primary tool to combat the Mexican cartels.  Although Mexico’s Army has 
approximately 200,000 soldiers, Mexico’s population is over 105 million, thus it is 
difficult if not impossible for the Mexican Army to protect the Mexican population from 
the Mexican cartels and part of the reason why over 28,000 people have been killed since 
President Calderon has taken over as President.  Mexican officials may be hesitant to 
allow U.S. military personnel to operate in Mexico; however, it is clear that the 
corruption of Mexican local, state, and municipal police has rendered them ineffective 
and the Mexican Army does not have sufficient personnel to defeat the cartels without 
outside assistance.  For this reason, an agreement such as the U.S. agreement with 
Colombia to allow U.S. military personnel to operate in Mexico is necessary to help 
defeat the Mexican cartels. 
Bonner argues that there are several lessons that should be drawn from 
Colombia’s successful campaign against the Medellin and Cali cartels.  First as 
mentioned, Mexico must take a multinational approach, which means accepting both 
support and assistance from the U.S.  The U.S. has provided funds but clearly Mexico 
needs manpower assistance to help defeat the Mexican cartels.  We must not forget that 
during the struggle with the Medellin and Cali cartels, Colombia had a homicide rate that 
                                                 
321 Simon Romero, “Increased U.S. Military Presence in Colombia Could Pose Problems with 
Neighbors,” The New York Times, July 22, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/americas/23colombia.html (accessed October 30, 2010). 
322 Ibid. 
 101
was eight times greater than Mexico’s current rate, yet with U.S. assistance, the 
Colombian government was able to defeat both the Medellin and Cali cartels.323     
A second way to improve our fight against the Mexican cartels is to have a 
specific goal or end state.  Plan Colombia had the desired end state of reducing coca 
cultivation by fifty percent and although Plan Colombia did not achieve this goal it did 
serve to help reduce the strength of the FARC.  Conversely, during the fight against the 
Medellin and Cali cartels, both the U.S. and Colombia concentrated their efforts in 
dismantling both cartels.  This should be the same approach both the U.S. and Mexico 
take in the short term.  We should focus less on the prevention of drugs being smuggled 
into the U.S. and more on the destruction of the large Mexican cartels who have 
challenged the Mexican state and have threatened to turn Mexico in to a narco-state.324  
Likewise, Bonner argues that Mexico and the U.S. should implement a divide-and-
conquer strategy similar to the one used by the U.S. and Colombia.  In the case of 
Colombia, the U.S. and Colombia initially concentrated all their efforts in defeating the 
Medellin cartel and once the Medellin cartel was defeated, their attention turned to the 
Cali cartel.  Mexico should follow a similar approach and focus on the most ruthless 
Mexican cartel, the Sinaloa cartel, and then continue to another cartel until all Mexican 
cartels have been defeated.  Furthermore, Mexico should implement a strategy known as 
the “kingpin strategy” that hinges on identifying, locating, and capturing the kingpins and 
key lieutenants of a particular DTO.325  This strategy proved effective in the fight against 
the Medellin and Cali cartels.      
Next, it is important for the law enforcement and judicial institutions to be 
aggressively reformed.326  As mentioned in chapter three, the majority of funds for both 
Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative emphasize interdiction and the buildup of 
military and police forces; however, as mentioned, Mexico is plagued by corruption at all 
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levels and it is important for the U.S. to set aside sufficient funds to help reform both the 
law enforcement and judicial institutions.  Mexican law enforcement has proven to be 
ineffective in combating the Mexican cartels due to the high levels of corruption, which 
is why the Mexican Army has become the primary organization used to fight the Mexican 
cartels.  Although the Mexican Army may not suffer from the high levels of corruption as 
Mexican law enforcement, it is important to note that counterdrug operations is not the 
primary mission of the Mexican Army.  In the fight against the Medellin and Cali cartel, 
the Colombian military played an important role; however, the Colombian National 
Police played the decisive role in defeating both cartels due to their ability to conduct 
investigations to support prosecutions, the recruitment of informants, and the use of 
electronic surveillance to gather evidence.327 
In summary, it is important for the U.S. to draw upon lessons from not only Plan 
Colombia but also from the Colombian fight against the Medellin and Cali cartels.  
Mexican cartels continue to extend their dominance not only in Mexico, but also 
throughout Central, South America, and even Europe.  The U.S. must establish both 
short-term and long-term goals in order to properly allocate funds to achieve the desired 
end state.  In the short term, it is critical for the U.S. to help the Mexican government 
reclaim control over its sovereign territory and provide security for its citizens.  In the 
long term, it is important for the U.S. to focus not only on the current threat, Mexico, but 
to also pay close attention to states that could eventually supplant Mexico as the new 
cocaine capital.  We must not forget that the drug trade is a $40 billion industry that some 
state or actor will try to stake a claim as long as there is a demand for the product.  With 
DTOs opening new drug routes to Africa and Europe, it is clear that there will be a 
continued demand for drugs and a continued struggle for state and actors to profit from a 
$40 billion industry.              
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